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Over fifty countries,1 including common, civil, and religious
law jurisdictions, currently recognize an individual's right
against self-incrimination.2 Although the scope and application
of the right against self-incrimination vary in each jurisdiction,3
the right, in its most basic form, accords an individual freedom
from compulsory self-accusation in a criminal proceeding.4 In
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of CriminalJustice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 265 n.138 (1993) (listing 48 countries that have constitu-
tionally codified right against self-incrimination). The right against self-incrimination is
also recognized in Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, Canada, Israel, Norway,
and the Shari'a, which is the Islamic sacred law. See Jeffrey K. Walker, A Comparative
Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1
(1993) (discussing application of right against self-incrimination in various foreign ju-
risdictions).
2. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION vii (1968).
Although the legal profession customarily refers to the right against self-in-
crimination as a 'privilege,' I call it a right because it is one.... Although the
right against self-incrimination originated in England as a common-law privi-
lege, the Fifth Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with the
same status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never deni-
grate by describing as mere privileges.
Id.
3. See Walker, supra note 1, at 19-27 (discussing slightly differing applications of
right against self-incrimination in France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Japan).
For example, in France the suspect may be held and interrogated for 48 hours without
even being advised of his right against self-incrimination. See BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE
STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: LAws AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION,
CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES 62, 79 (1987) (describing rights of French authorities to
not inform suspect of right against self-incrimination until brought before judge and to
hold suspect for up to 48 hours without bringing suspect before judge). In contrast, in
the Netherlands there is no requirement that a suspect even be told of this right. Man-
fred Pieck, The Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Civil Law, 11 AM. J.
COMP. L. 585, 597 (1962).
4. See U.S CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... "); see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14(3)(g), S. TREATY DOC. No.
95-2, at 28, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the
United States Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("In the determination of any crimi-
nal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guaran-
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light of such widespread acceptance, which transcends religious,
ethnic, and political boundaries, the principle that no one
should be compelled to give evidence against himself in a crimi-
nal proceeding can be characterized as a fundamental human
right.5
The widespread availability of a natural person's right
against self-incrimination 6 is not as certain 7 when the right is ap-
plied to juristic, or legal, persons.8 Several jurisdictions have
held that because the right developed specifically to protect nat-
ural persons, 9 it is unavailable to entities like corporations,'"
tees, in full equality ... Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt.").
5. See ICCPR, supra note 4, pmbl., S. TREAT Doc. No. 95-2 at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at
173 (stating that ICCPR was, in part, concerned with "the promotion of universal re-
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms"). More than
one-third of the world's states are party to the ICCPR. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing ubiquity of right against self-
incrimination).
7. See Environment Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392,
398-403 (1993) (Austl.) (comparing differing treatment of corporation's right against
self-incrimination among U.S., British, Canadian, and New Zealand courts).
8. See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE LJ. 1641, 1641 n.1
(1982) (defining juristic person as "a being who can be a bearer of a right and conse-
quently claim standing in a court"). The three traditional models of the corporate
personality are the fiction theory, the contract theory, and the realism theory. Id. at
1645-52. The fiction, or concession, theory states that a corporation's identity is based
entirely on the state's grant of legal status to the corporation. Id. at 1645-47. The
contract view holds that a corporation is simply a summarizing device for the rights and
duties of the parties who contracted to form the corporation. Id. at 1647-49. The real-
ism theory views corporations as an intricate system of productive organization with a
logic of its own. Id. at 1649-51. These models are important because the basic rights
granted to a corporation will very often depend on which theory of corporate personal-
ity a court or promulgating body presumes. See id. at 1657 (discussing "inconsistent
patchwork of constitutional law" that results from applying different theories of corpo-
rate personality); see also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCITY 13-119 (1986) (offering comprehensive dis-
cussion of interaction between ontological definition of corporation and basic rights
granted pursuant to that definition).
9. See MARK BERGER, TARING THE FIFTH 57 (1980) (discussing development of law
to protect "people ... and their liberties").
10. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906). In this case the Supreme Court
held, as one of three separate rationales for denying the right against self-incrimination
to a corporation, that the Fifth Amendment "is purely a personal privilege." Thus, be-
cause corporations, as fictional legal persons, can testify or act only through agents, the
Fifth Amendment is unavailable to such fictional constructs. Id.; see Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at
405 ("[T]he modem and international treatment of the privilege as a human right
which protects personal freedom, privacy and human dignity is a less than convincing
argument for holding that corporations should enjoy the privilege.").
CORPORATE SELF-INCRIMINATION
which exist only as legal persons.11 In contrast, other jurisdic-
tions have found that, for the purpose of the right against self-
incrimination, there is no principled difference between a legal
and natural person, and, therefore, the right should be available
to corporations as well as natural persons.' 2
This Note provides a comparison of the treatment of a cor-
poration's right against self-incrimination in Australia, the
United States, and the European Union and argues that the Eu-
ropean Union's approach is superior because it better maintains
an equitable balance of power between the state and the corpo-
ration. Part I examines the historical framework of the corpo-
rate right against self-incrimination, including the recent revi-
sions to the traditional theory of the right's historical develop-
ment and changes in the relationship between the state and the
corporate entity. Part II explores the current treatment of a cor-
poration's right against self-incrimination in the United States,
the European Union, and Australia. Part III analyzes the contin-
ued viability of each jurisdiction's policy justifications for its cur-
rent treatment of a corporation's right against self-incrimina-
tion, judging the European Union's approach to be the most
legitimate because it maintains an equitable balance of power
between the corporation and the state. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that the United States and Australia should allow corpora-
tions to claim the right against self-incrimination any time the
state attempts to compel incriminatory information from the
corporation, whether by written answer or through its principal
executives.
I. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF A CORPORATE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The lengthy development of the right against self-incrimina-
tion13 is critical to determining the underlying historical reasons
11. See supra note 8 (discussing characteristics of legal person).
12. See, e.g., New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v. Master & Sons Ltd.,
[1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 191, 196 (stating that "[t]here seems no policy reason why a corpora-
tion should not avail itself of the rule" granting right against self-incrimination); Tri-
plex Safety Glass Co. Ltd. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd., [1939] 2 KB. 395, 409
(CtApp.) (asserting that court could "see no ground for depriving ajuristic person of
those safeguards which the law of England accords even the least deserving of natural
person").
13. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Tal-
mudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955, 956 (1988) (comparing U.S.
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for the right's existence,' 4 which in turn help elucidate the
proper boundaries of the right.'5 The right's history and the
reasons for its development are similarly important to determin-
ing the proper application to corporations.16  The traditional
view of the right's early development, which has been used to
justify the denial of the right against self-incrimination to corpo-
rations,' 7 maintains that the right developed as a result of resist-
ance to the mistreatment of English political and religious mi-
norities. 8 Recent scholarship challenges this traditional view,'9
right against self-incrimination with similar Talmudic rule); see also BERGER, supra note
9, at 1 n.1 (specifying various sections of Bible that express disapproval of oath-taking,
including Matthew 5:33-37, Exodus 20:7 and Deuteronomy 5:11); LEVY, supra note 2, at viii
(pointing out that right against self-incrimination predates freedoms of speech, press,
and religion, benefit of counsel, immunity against bills of attainder, and prohibitions of
ex post facto laws and unreasonable searches and seizures).
14. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). As Justice Frankfurter
wrote, "The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific provision of which it is pecu-
liarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' " Id. (quoting New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner. 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)); see also Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) ("The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that
was hard-earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution -
and the necessities for its preservation - are to be found in the lessons of history.");
Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 405 ("In light of these conflicting approaches, it is necessary now to
examine the historical basis of the privilege"); CHARILES McCoRmicK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 114, at 279 (3d ed. 1987). McCormick asserts that the origin and
development- of the right has been of "special interest to legal scholars" because of
reservations concerning the propriety of the right as a whole. Id.
15. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Evi-
DENCE IN TRALS AT COMMON LAw § 2250, at 277 (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE]. "So much of [the right] lies in its interpretation that its scope will be greatly
affected by the spirit in which that interpretation is approached. Much law can be
settled by consideration of its historic scope, before the constitutions were made." Id.
16. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978). "Whether or
not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for
some other reason depends on the nature, history and purpose of the particular consti-
tutional provision." Id.; see Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 404 (discussing importance of right's
history).
17. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14 ("Certain 'purely personal' guarantees, such as
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and
other organizations because the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has been
limited to the protection of individuals." (citing to United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,
698-701 (1944)); see also Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 404 (discussing Australian High Court's
partial reliance on historical development of right against self-incrimination as human
right in denying right to corporations).
18. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 2250, at 277 (discussing opposition
to oath ex officio as one basis for development of right against self-incrimination).
19. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1994) ("Recent scholar-
ship has done much to cast doubt on the correctness of the received wisdom concern-
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finding both that the right actually appeared first in the ius com-
mune2° and that the right was finally accepted only because of
structural changes to eighteenth century criminal procedure.21
Similarly, changes in the relationship between the state and the
corporate entity, such as the rejection of the concession theory
of corporate existence and increased regulatory supervision by
the state, are also highly relevant to determining the proper ap-
plication of the right against self-incrimination to corporations.22
A. The Traditional Historical Theory of the Development of the Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The traditional view of the development of the right against
self-incrimination (or "traditional view") traces the right back to
the constitutional struggles in seventeenth century England.2"
This view characterizes the right's development as a result of the
resistance of the accusatorially-based 24 English common law
courts and England's religious minorities to the inquisitorial
methods2" of the English prerogative and ecclesiastical courts. 6
ing the history of the common law privilege."); see alsoJohn H. Langbein, The Historical
Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1047 (1994) (ar-
guing that right against self-incrimination resulted from rise of adversarial criminal pro-
cedure).
20. R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the
European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 964 (1990) (discussing original source of
privilege). The ius commune is the legal system which resulted from the merging of
Roman civil law and the Catholic Church's ecclesiastical law. Id.
21. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1047.
22. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation on Ameri-
can Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1483 (1987) (discussing corporation as quintessential
economic man).
23. LEvy, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing'development of right against self-incrimi-
nation).
24. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 3-5 (discussing origin of accusatorial system in pre-
Norman Anglo-Saxon England). Distinguishing features of the early English accusato-
rial system include public accusation by an identified accuser and a court that does not
ultimately determine the accused's guilt or innocence. Id. at 4.
25. See Charles H. Randall,Jr., Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 8 S.C. L.Q. 417, 420-21 (1956) (describing early spread of inquisitorial proce-
dures). The inquisitorial method became standard procedure on the European conti-
nent and eventually served as the foundation for the modem continental civil law sys-
tems. Id. Early inquisitorial procedures included, for example, examining the accused
in secret and requiring him to swear on his oath. LEVY, supra note 2, at 29. Addition-
ally, the judge in the early inquisitorial system had nearly unlimited powers, acting as
accuser, prosecutor and judge. Id.
26. See Harold W. Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire, 3 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 213, 218 (1952) (discussing role of common law lawyers and Puritans in develop-
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The principal cause of such resistance was the use of the oath ex
officio, 17 an inquisitorial oath administered by a court at the out-
set of an inquiry whereby the accused swore to answer any and
all questions the court might ask him.28 Because the accused
swore the oath without knowing the subject of the interrogation,
he was essentially swearing to give evidence against himself.
29
Further, to decline to swear the oath was to admit guilt.30 Indi-
viduals subjected to the oath, in an attempt to shield themselves
from this prejudicial oath,3' began to assert the principle nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere,3 2 or "no one is obliged to accuse him-
self."33  Eventually, this principle would develop into a funda-
mental principle of common law, the right against self-incrimi-
nation.3 4
1. The Early Use of the Oath Ex Officio
The oath ex officio originated in Pope Innocent III's late
ment of right against self-incrimination); see also LEw, supra note 2, at 42 (setting forth
religious, social and political factors that contributed to development of right against
self-incrimination). The prerogative courts were founded by royal commission and had
criminal jurisdiction, but unlike the common law courts, these courts employed inquisi-
torial procedures. Id. at 41-42. The ecclesiastical courts were church courts, governed
by inquisitorial canonical law, which originally claimed jurisdiction over all matters re-
lating to the clergy, sexual conduct, marriages, wills, the correction of sinners, and
church properties. Id. at 43.
27. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 114, at 279 (asserting that right had its roots
in opposition to ex officio oath); see also Helen Silving, The Oath: , 68 YALE L.J. 1329,
1366 (1959) (stating that "the introduction of the oath de veritae dicenda [ ] seems to
have created the controversy from which our privilege against self-incrimination
arose."). The oath de veritae dicenda came to be known as the oath ex officio in England.
BERCER, supra note 9, at 6.
28. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1073.
29. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 965 (characterizing oath as allowing "fishing
expeditions for evidence of immorality or religious heterodoxy").
30. See Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MicH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1930) ("[A] refusal to take the oath or to answer under it
was taken as a confession of the offense charged.").
31. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 6 (listing unpleasant options available to defendant
confronted with oath and calling it "nearly foolproof in securing the conviction of those
against whom [the oath was] directed").
32. See LEvy, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing 1537 trial of John Lambert as early
example attempting to use right against self-incrimination).
33. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1072.
34. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 19 (describing 1649 trial of John Lilburne, where
right against self-incrimination was first articulated as accepted principle by high level
English court).
1995] CORPORATE SELF-INCRIMINATION 2145
twelfth and early thirteenth century reforms"5 of the canonical
law.3 6 These reforms were approved by the Fourth Lateran
Council in 1215, and by 1236 the oath had been introduced to
the English ecclesiastical courts by Cardinal Otho. 7 The oath
was utilized in England for the first time in 1246 by the bishop of
Lincoln in conducting an investigation into local immorality."
Because the oath's inquisitorial nature was an anathema to
the existing English criminal legal system, 9 which was accusato-
rial in nature,40 English citizens brought before the ecclesiastical
courts immediately challenged the oath's use.41 Unlike the early
English common law criminal system, which offered the defend-
ant a public accusation by an identified accuser,42 the oath ex
officio brought the accused within the power of the court before
the accused knew the charges against him, essentially permitting
the court to question the accused until some violation was un-
covered.43 Consequently, in response to the early use of the
oath, Henry III issued writs ordering that his sheriffs prevent
English subjects from answering any questions under oath.'
Eventually, Henry III was forced to bring contempt proceedings
35. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 2250, at 281. See BERGER, supra note 9,
at 5 (citing Pope Innocent III's zealousness in rooting out heretics as driving force
behind rise of inquisitional procedure). By the end of the thirteenth century, the in-
quisitional form of procedure, and especially the oath ex officio, had become the
Church's primary weapon in the ruthless Holy Inquisition. See LEW, supra note 2, at 25-
29 (tracing role of inquisitional procedure and oath in origination of Holy Inquisition
and subsequent atrocities).
36. See BLACK'S LAw DIGrIoNARY 206 (6th ed. 1990). Canon law, the Roman eccle-
siastical jurisprudence, consists of the decrees or ecclesiastical constitutions and the
decretal or canonical epistles written by the pope, or the pope and cardinals. Id.
37. John Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HAtv. L. REv. 71, 72 (1892).
Cardinal Otho, who was legate to Pope Gregory IX, was one of a number of church
officials who came to England upon the marriage of Henry III to his French wife. BER-
GER, supra note 9, at 6.
38. E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MIN. L. REv. 1, 1-2
(1949).
39. See LEw, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that Henry III called oath "derogatory
to his crown because it was 'repugnant to the ancient Customs of his Realm' ").
40. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing accusatorial nature of
early English criminal legal system).
41. See id. (describing complaints concerning initial use of inquisitorial oath).
42. See supra note 24 (discussing early features of England's accusatorial system).
43. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text (explaining dangers of oath ex
officio).
44. Morgan, supra note 38, at 2 (discussing Henry III's issuance of writs against
various bishops as result of English citizens complaints concerning inquisitorial proce-
dures).
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against the offending clergymen.45 In the face of the Church's
obstinacy, these measures failed and the use of the oath contin-
ued.4 6
Henry III's resistance to the Church's encroachments on his
sovereignty epitomizes the type of opposition that eventually
gave rise to the right against self-incrimination. 47 Additional
early resistance to the use of the oath was encountered from the
common law courts, which, in an effort to halt the expansion of
the ecclesiastical courts' power, issued writs prohibiting Church
officials from conducting certain legal proceedings. 48 Finally, in
the early fourteenth century, several laws were passed limiting
the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction and the use of the oath ex
officio.49
The oath, however, was too effective in securing convic-
tions,5 and in the early fourteenth century, the Crown began to
make use of the oath as well.51 By the early fourteenth century,
the Privy, or King's, Council, which consisted of England's most
powerful clergy and nobles, was developing into the country's
most formidable political body.52 Among its several functions,5"
the Council administered a prerogative court54 whose proce-
45. LEW, supra note 2, at 47.
46. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 3 (discussing use of oath ex officio in 1252).
47. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing role that resistance to
inquisitorial criminal procedures played in development of right against self-incrimina-
tion).
48. BERGER, supra note 9, at 7.
49. Morgan, supra note 38, at 3-4 (discussing De Articuli C/eric, 9 Edw. 2, 1315-1316
(Eng.), and Prohibitio Formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri. 1 STAT. AT LG. 403 (Eng.) (Danby
Pickering ed., 1762)). These statutes set forth some clear jurisdictional boundaries for
the ecclesiastical courts and forbid the use of the oath ex officio except in matrimonial
or testamentary matters. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 3-4.
50. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing obvious effectiveness of oath); see also
supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (describing nature of oath ex officio).
51. Morgan, supra note 38, at 4. Inquisitorial procedures were "creeping into secu-
lar practice, in the courts of the king's bench and common pleas, as early as the reign of
Edward I." Id. (quoting 35 SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL (1243-1482) xlii
(I.S. Leadman &J.F. Baldwin eds., 1918)).
52. LEvy, supra note 2, at 49. This body included officials of the king's household
and the realm's preeminent judges and lawyers. Id.
53. See id. These functions included legislative, executive, and judicial duties that,
over time, slowly became differentiated. Id. This differentiation produced offshoots or
committees of the Council that eventually became the House of Lords, the central
courts of the common law, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of King's Bench.
Id.
54. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (defining nature of prerogative
courts and discussing their role in development of right against self-incrimination).
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dures and jurisdiction were highly discretionary.55 These proce-
dures included, by the King's permission, the right to employ
the oath ex officio.56
Parliament attempted to combat this new use of the oath,
passing condemnations of the oath, petitioning the crown to
end the practice, and eventually enacting statutes outlawing the
entire oath procedure. 57 Although the oath was the primary tar-
get of these actions, all aspects of the inquisitorial process were
challenged. 8 Significantly, in their various condemnations and
petitions, the Parliament consistently alluded to the Magna
Carta as the ultimate authority for condemning the use of the
inquisitorial process by the Council and the ecclesiastical
courts.5 9
The common law courts were resisting the use of the oath ex
officio by the ecclesiastical courts because it encroached on their
jurisdiction,6" while Parliament was disputing the Privy Council's
use of the oath because such inquisitorial procedures were con-
trary to the law of the land.6' Before the resistance could coa-
lesce into an articulated right against self-incrimination, the bat-
tle against heresy finally reached England.62
55. Lvw, supra note 2, at 49.
56. Id. at 51.
57. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 4-5 (discussing "protests from the Commons" and
mid-thirteenth century statutes prohibiting inquisitorial procedures). These statutes in-
cluded Statute of Purveyors, 24 Edw. 3, ch. 4 (Eng.), and 42 Edw. 3, ch. 4 (Eng.), which
proscribed the use of the oath ex officio without formal presentment of the defendant.
Id.; see McCoRMicK, supra note 14, § 114, at 280 (discussing petitions urging King to
prohibit use of oath in Council proceedings as evidence that there was opposition to
use of inquisitorial procedures in common law courts).
58. LEw, supra note 2, at 53.
59. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 4-5 (discussing various statues mentioning Magna
Carta); id. at 52-53 (reviewing various statutes and petitions citing to Magna Carta as
support); see BERGER, supra note 9, at 7. For example, Parliament opposed the oath by
charging that it violated the Magna Carta's law-of-the-land provision, which guaranteed
that no man would be convicted except by judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land. Id.
60. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing that early resistance resulted mostly
from power struggle between established common law courts and ecclesiastical courts);
see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing resistance by common law
courts to oath ex officio); Morgan, supra note 38, at 5 (concluding that early opposition
to inquisitorial procedures was result of both jurisdictional conflicts and hatred of
"forced subjection to inquisitional procedure").
61. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing Parliament's resist-
ance to inquisitorial system).
62. See L vy, supra note 2, at 53-54 (discussing how England had for most part
avoided religious persecution that had plagued Continent).
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2. Religious Persecution and the Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The English version of the Inquisition began around 1400.63
In response to the rise of a allegedly heretical sect called the
Lollards,64 the Church began a determined and brutal campaign
to eliminate all deviant religious practices and beliefs.65 More
importantly, at a time when resistance to the use of the oath ex
officio and other inquisitorial procedures was growing, 66 the
Church, by emphasizing that the possible spread of these here-
sies threatened the souls of all the faithful,6 7 was able to coerce
Parliament and the Crown into cooperating with the oppression
of the Lollards. 68 Parliament went so far as to pass the De Haeret-
ico Comburendo, a statute that allowed the burning of heretics.
69
The state's official support of the Inquisition 71 legitimized the
procedures used in attempting to eliminate heresy, including
63. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplained Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 101, 112
(1992) (discussing passing of De Haeretico Comburendo in 1401 as beginning of English
Inquisition). See also LEVY, supra note 2, at 55-56 (identifying beginning of English In-
quisition as 1382, when several leaders of Lollards were accused of and tried for her-
esy).
64. Randall, supra note 25, at 425 ("During the rise of Lollardry, the ecclesiastical
forces were able to induce the enactment of the famous statute De Haeretico Com-
burendo.").
65. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing Catholic Church's reaction to rise of
Lollardry); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing reaction of ecclesi-
astical authorities to rise of Lollardry).
66. See supra notes 39-62 and accompanying text (discussing early increase in
resistance to oath ex officio and inquisitorial system).
67. See LEvY, supra note 2, at 54 (offering comprehensive explanation of perceived
danger of religious dissent). The theoretical justification for this position was that her-
esy was contagious and could be passed between individuals, threatening their souls
with eternal damnation. See id. (describing heresy as contagion). Further, because
there was one body of revealed knowledge, any deviation questioned the purity of the
faith and the convictions of the true believers. Id. From the Crown's more practical
view, the sovereign was subject to excommunication for allowing the threat to the faith-
ful or permitting doubt to exist. Id. Finally, where there was doubt concerning the
Church's teachings, a schism would likely occur, resulting in social disorder. Id.
68. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 8 (relating that in 1401 Parliament passed De Haer-
etico Comburendo, which provided that heretics could be burned); see also LEw, supra
note 2, at 57-58 (discussing Henry IV's issuance of writ allowing burning of "convicted"
heretic).
69. 2 Hen. 4, ch. 15 (Eng.).
70. See LEv_, supra note 2, at 60 (estimating that between 1401 and 1534 fifty peo-
ple were burned and thousands were persecuted for their religious beliefs).
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the oath ex officio and torture.7 1 As a result, until the early six-
teenth century, the resistance to the oath virtually disappeared.72
By the 1530's, however, resistance to inquisitorial proce-
dures had reappeared in the form of influential writings by,
among others, William Tyndale and Christopher St. Germain.7 3
These two men, especially St. Germain, fashioned devastating
legal and moral attacks on inquisitorial procedures in general
and the oath ex officio in particular.7 4 In 1532, Parliament ex-
pressed its agreement by submitting a petition to King Henry
VIII listing the many grievances against the oath.75 After offer-
ing the petition to Church officials for comment, Henry VIII ap-
proved the petition, and in 1534 the De Haeretico Comburendo was
repealed.76
Although Henry VIII supported the repeal of the De Haeret-
ico Comburendo, he did so only as a means to further his scheme
to become the head of the Church of England.77 Once he
achieved this position by formally breaking with Rome, he began
to use the same inquisitorial procedures he had recently op-
71. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 6 (discussing cooperation of government and
church in persecuting heretics); BERGER, supra note 9, at 8 (depicting Inquisition as
"the utilization of the state's power to support ecclesiastical efforts to control heresy,"
which resulted in "the emergence of the oath interrogation as an important, if not
dominant, procedural technique"); see also LEvy, supra note 2, at 34-35 (discussing use
of torture by English prerogative courts).
72. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 6. Morgan notes that "for a century and a third"
the lay authorities and courts cooperated with the ecclesiastical courts in the prosecu-
tion of heretics and that "opposition to the oath ex officio again became vocal" during
Henry VIII's reign. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See LEvY, supra note 2, at 63-67 (oudining basic writings of Tyndale and St.
Germain). Tyndale was the first man to translate the New Testament from Greek to
English, and he authored The Obedience of a Christian Man, published in 1528, a work
that was possibly the first to liken self-incrimination to self-infamy and that foreshad-
owed the language of the Fifth Amendment by asserting that it was wrong to compel
men to testify against themselves. Id. at 63-64. St. Germain, on the other hand, was one
of the first to champion the common law over the canon law and to specifically criticize
the oath ex officio. Id. at 64.
74. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Tyndale and St.
Germain's writings).
75. See LEvy, supra note 2, at 66-67 (describing Parliament's 1532 petition).
76. A Repeal of the Statute of 2 H. 4, c. 15 and a Confirmation of the Statutes of 3
R. 2, St. 2, c. 5 and 2 H. 5, St. 1, c. 7, Touching the Punishment of Hereticks, 25 Hen. 8,
ch. 14 (Eng.). This statute did not outlaw the use of the oath; rather, it limited such use
by requiring a formal charge before the oath could be used in ecclesiastical courts.
Herman, supra note 63, at 114.
77. BERGER, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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posed, including the oath ex officio,78 to persecute those who
would not recognize him as the ultimate head of the Church of
England.79
3. The High Commission and the Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The development of the right against self-incrimination pro-
ceeded as a result of the creation, evolution, and, finally, the de-
mise of the High Commission." An early version of the High
Commission was created by Queen Mary" to further a vicious
campaign of persecution"2 during the restoration the Catholic
Church to England."3 During this period of persecution, known
as the Marian Inquisition, Queen Mary created a prerogative8 4
commission whose mandate was to punish heretics as efficiently
and severely as possible.8 5 In order to fulfill its mandate, Queen
Mary's commission was given total discretion to determine its
procedure, was commanded to use the oath ex officio, and was
given wide latitude as to what crimes it would prosecute. 8 The
breadth of the commission's powers and jurisdiction established
a precedent that would later prove valuable to Elizabeth I,
78. Neill H. Alford, The Right to Silence, 79 YALE LJ. 1618, 1623 (1970) (reviewing
LAWRENCE W. LEw, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION (1968)).
79. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 69 (noting that between repeal of De Haeretico Com-
burendo and Henry VIII's death in 1547, fifty-one people were burned for heresy).
80. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1047 ("Prior historical scholarship has located
the origins of the common law privilege in the second half of the seventeenth century,
as part of the aftermath of the constitutional struggles that resulted in the abolition of
the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission.").
81. See LEw, supra note 2, at 76-77 '(discussing Queen Mary's commission as pre-
cursor to Elizabeth I's infamous High Commission). The earliest antecedent of the
High Commission can be traced back to a commission granted to Cromwell by Henry
VIII, but these commissions did not "undertakejudicial task as a matter of routine until
1557 under a Marian Commission." Alford, supra note 78, at 1624.
82. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 75 (noting that in last four years of Queen Mary's
reign, approximately 273 alleged heretics were burned). Mary, popularly known as
"Bloody Mary," ruled for only five years, from 1553 until 1558. Id. at 75, 77.
83. See Herman, supra note 63, at 116 ("The throne returned to Catholicism when
Mary succeeded Edward.").
84. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing characteristics of preroga-
tive court).
85. LEVY, supra note 2, at 76.
86. See id. at 76-77 (describing powers that Queen Mary's prerogative letters
granted to new commission).
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Mary's successor, in establishing the High Commission. 7
Another noteworthy consequence of the Marian Inquisition
was the first widespread attempt by accused heretics to claim a
right against self-incrimination. 8 At this time, claims to a right
against self-incrimination usually consisted of a refusal to give
the oath ex officio or to answer any questions 9 and were a direct
result of the brutality and effectiveness of this new commission. 90
Despite the lack of standard language, these claims became fairly
common 91 and would be echoed in later struggles against the
oath.92
Upon ascending to the throne in 1558, Elizabeth I immedi-
ately re-established Protestantism as the state religion and at-
tempted to strengthen the Crown's control of the church.93 Her
first concern was to pacify her Catholic subjects, who were in
nearly open rebellion over the supplanting of Queen Mary's
brief restoration of the Catholic Church. 94 As an initial measure,
87. See Herman, supra note 63, at 116 (stating that Queen Mary's commission
"eventually became the Court of High Commission").
88. See LEw, supra note 2, at 75-77 (recounting attempts by accused heretics to
assert yet unformed right against self-incrimination and avoid oath ex officio).
89. See Herman, supra note 63, at 116 (discussing early attempts to avoid self-in-
crimination by non-Catholics brought before Queen Mary's commission).
90. See Law, supra note 2, at 76-77 (relating atrocities of Marian Inquisition and
claiming that Inquisition "provoked the first widespread attempt by criminal defend-
ants - suspected heretics all - to refuse to answer for fear of self-incrimination").
91. Id. at 79. The attempts to claim this right were documented in the Book of
Martyrs, which was written and published byJohn Foxe in 1563. Id. at 79-81. The Book
of Martyrs described the trials of famous heretics during the Marian Inquisition, depict-
ing the resultant executions in garish woodcuttings. Id at 79-80. Although the book is
primarily anti-Catholic propaganda, the descriptions of the trials are essentially accu-
rate and each trial contains specific examples of the abuse of the common law rights of
the accused by the oath ex officio and the inquisitorial process in general. Id. at 80-82.
The book was incredibly influential, effectively enlightening the many who read it to
the rights and privileges which private citizens should be afforded by their government.
Id. at 79. In fact, the book is described as "for a century and more the most popular
and most influential book in the English-speaking world, second only to the Bible." Id.
92. See id. at 166-67 (relating 1590 trial of Robert Udall, who claimed there was no
law that required him to accuse himself).
93. See Randall, supra note 25, at 426 (discussing Elizabeth I's efforts to give Crown
jurisdiction over all spiritual matters). Elizabeth I's most important action in solidifying
the Crown's control of religious matters was signing the Act of Supremacy. 1 Eliz., c. 1
(Eng.); see Randall, supra note 25, at 426 (discussing Elizabeth's attempt to "firmly es-
tablish the national church"). This statute restored the Crown's jurisdiction over "all
manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abusers, offenses and enormities." 1 Eliz., c. 1
(Eng.).
94. See Herman, supra note 63, at 116-17. Between 1569 and 1572, Elizabeth de-
feated a rebellion by her pro-Catholic earls, was excommunicated from the Catholic
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Elizabeth created an ecclesiastical commission to search out al-
legedly disloyal Catholics. 95 This commission, aided by repres-
sive legislation,96 was extremely effective in silencing Catholic
opposition.97
By the early 1580's, Elizabeth I and various high officials of
the Anglican Church had concluded that the Puritans were be-
coming as dangerous to the Crown and the Anglican Church as
the Catholics.9" In order to force the Ecclesiastical Commission,
the direct descendant of Queen Mary's commission, to turn its
attention to the Puritans,9 9 Elizabeth appointed John Whitgift,
who was personally loyal to her, 100 as Archbishop of Canterbury
and head of the Ecclesiastical Commission. 01 By the end of
1583, Elizabeth had authorized the reorganization of the Ecclesi-
astical Commission under Whitgift, and the reconstituted body
became known as the High Commission.1
0 2
This new entity's jurisdiction was so broad as to effectively
be limited only by the commissioners' discretion. 10 3 Its powers
included the right to employ the oath ex officio and the right to
Church, and discovered a Catholic plot to overthrow her government. Id. Additionally,
Pope Pius V released her subjects "from allegiance to her." Id. Finally, in 1580, Pope
Gregory XIII stated that it would not be a sin to kill Elizabeth. Id. at 117.
95. See Randall, supra note 25, at 438 (discussing creation of commission). This
commission was created pursuant to the Act of Supremacy, which specifically author-
ized the Queen to create such commissions and articulate their powers and jurisdiction.
Id.; see supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Act of Supremacy).
96. See LEw, supra note 2, at 108. For example, by 1585 all Catholic priests were,
by law, guilty of high treason. Id.
97. See id. at 87, 92. After 1570, when Elizabeth I was excommunicated, over a
hundred priests were executed for various political crimes. Id.
98. See id. at 117 (discussing perceived similarities between Catholic and Puritan
dissenters); see also id. at 119 (stating that Puritan movement gained strength because
authorities were preoccupied with suppression of Catholics).
99. See id. at 120 (asserting that, because of sympathy for Puritan movement at
highest levels of government, Commission had thus far been fairly lenient on Puritans).
100. See id. (discussing Whitgift's character and devotion to queen).
101. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 11 (portraying appointment of Whitgift as impor-
tant event in development of right against self-incrimination).
102. See Wigmore, supra note 37, at 76-77 (discussing origins of Commission over
which Whitgift presided). Under Whitgift, "a man of stem Christian zeal, determined
to crush heresy wherever its head was raised," the High Commission became a potent
political force. Id.
103. See LEvy, supra note 2, at 126-27 (delineating jurisdiction of High Commis-
sion). The High Commission's jurisdiction extended to: all offenses normally punish-
able by ecclesiastical courts; violations of any statute passed for the maintenance of
religion; heretical opinions; seditious writings, contempts, and conspiracies; false ru-
mors; slanderous words; religious errors, schisms, and recusancy; and doctrinal regula-
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impose immediate fines or imprisonment.10 4  Moreover, the
Commission had the choice to operate with or without a jury, as
well as the power to summon witnesses and punish anyone not
obeying its orders." 5
By the late sixteenth century, then, the Puritans were per-
ceived to be the primary threat to the established order.10 6 Fur-
thermore, the general population, by way of The Book of Martyrs,
had some conception of their common law rights." 7 The High
Commission was fully operative and employing the oath ex officio
on a regular basis,' and resistance to the High Commission
and its use of the oath was increasing.10 9
4. The Appearance of the Modem Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The appearance of the articulated right against self-incrimi-
nation in the mid-seventeenth century resulted from the fall of
the Star Chamber" 0 and the High Commission."' The attack
on these institutions escalated in the late sixteenth century, led
by Robert Beale, a gifted lawyer and member of Parliament who
tion of the Anglican ministry. Id. The Commission'sjurisdiction also had no geograph-
ical boundaries. Helmholz, supra note 20, at 965.
104. Helmholz, supra note 20, at 965. Older ecclesiastical courts were limited to
imposing excommunication and public penance. Id. In contrast, "[a]ny procedure
which the High Commission might wish to follow was prescripted." Id.
105. See LEvy, supra note 2, at 127 (discussing powers allowed High Commission by
Queen Elizabeth).
106. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 12 (characterizing perceived threat from Catholic
Church as "reduced" as result of England's defeat of Spanish Armada in 1588).
107. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing The Book of Martyrs).
108. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing 1590 High Commission proceed-
ings against John Udall); see also LEw, supra note 2, at 141 (describing disciplinary ac-
tions taken by High Commission against over 200 ministers by 1584).
109. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that "[b]y the early seventeenth cen-
tury common law prohibitions were increasingly used against the oath to the consterna-
tion of church officials").
110. See McCoRMicK, supra note 14, § 114, at 280 (discussing formation and pur-
poses of Star Chamber). The Star Chamber, also a prerogative court, had its source in
the judicial branch of the Privy Council. Lsw, supra note 2, at 49; see supra notes 51-56
and accompanying text (describing Privy Council's development into several differenti-
ated functions). The Star Chamber's procedures were determined entirely at its discre-
tion, but it was more inquisitorial than accusatorial, making regular use of the oath ex
officio. See LEvy, supra note 2, at 100-01 (analyzing procedural rules of Star Chamber).
111. See supra note 80 (discussing abolition of Star Chamber and High Commis-
sion).
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worked as the Clerk of the Privy Council.' 12 Beale, through his
writings and Parliamentary speeches, was the foremost lay critic
of the High Commission."' His attacks on the High Commis-
sion revived the argument that the oath ex officio was contrary to
the Magna Carta. 1 4 Although this argument was not historically
accurate," 5 his quotation of the Magna Carta had the important
effect of turning a document that originally guaranteed the
rights of the great landowners into a charter that ensured the
basic rights of all." 6 Building on Beale's argument, attacks on
the High Commission and the Star Chamber based on the
Magna Carta became commonplace.117
The assault on the oath continued in the early seventeenth
century under the direction of another exceptional lawyer,
Nicholas Fuller," 8 and the Chief Justice of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Sir Edward Coke." 9 Fuller fought the oath at every
turn, defending Puritans, speaking at Commons against the
royal prerogative, sponsoring bills to reaffirm the Magna Carta
or disable the High Commission, and even refusing to take the
oath when he became a defendant himself.' 20 He also published
an extremely influential and persuasive pamphlet arguing
against the use of the oath ex officio and for the elimination of
112. See LEW, supra note 2, at 170 (referring to Beale as "the most prolific critic" of
High Commission's oath procedure).
113. Id. at 170-71.
114. See LEw, supra note 2, at 171-72 (discussing Beale's use of Magna Carta as
support for his argument that oath ex officio was illegal). The first use of this argument
was Parliament's fourteenth century attempt to cite Magna Carta as legal basis for oppo-
sition to Privy Council's use of oath ex officio. See supra note 58 and accompanying text
(discussing Privy Council's use of oath ex officio). Additionally, Beale argued that
prohibitions issued by the thirteenth century English civil courts against proceedings by
the ecclesiastical courts supported his argument that the oath was illegal. BERGER, supra
note 9, at 12. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing early resistance
by English civil courts to expanding jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts).
115. See R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rxv. 763, 764 (1938). As Pittman points
out, the privilege against self-incrimination was never a part of the Magna Carta. Id.
116. LEV, supra note 2, at 171-72.
117. See id. at 246-47 (discussing citation to Magna Carta by William Coke and by
various Puritan pamphleteers).
118. See id. at 232 (describing Fuller as active defense attorney for Puritan dissent-
ers).
119. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 13 ("The appointment of Sir Edward Coke as
chiefjustice of the Court of Common Pleas in 1606 led to even more resistance to the
compulsory self-incrimination procedures of the ecclesiastical courts.").
120. LEVY, supra note 2, at 232.
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the High Commission. 12 1
Sir Edward Coke used his position as Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas to oppose, on an official level, the
power of the High Commission. 12 2 For example, Coke issued
numerous writs of prohibition, 12 1 which enjoined the ecclesiasti-
cal courts from hearing or deciding a specific suit based on the
illegality of the oath ex officio.124 Furthermore, Coke, answering
a question from the House of Commons, declared that the oath
was illegal except in cases affecting wills and marriages, 12 5 and
later, in two of his King's Bench opinions, 26 even asserted the
principle that no man would be forced to accuse himself.1
2 1
As recognition of the oath ex officio's inherent immorality
increased,128 the use of the oath declined until it was, for a short
period of time, not a major issue. 1 29 The theoretical underpin-
nings of the resistance to the oath had matured as well.' No
longer was the oath viewed as simply unfair or even illegal on the
121. Id. at 234-35.
122. See Randall, supra note 25, at 446 ("Wigmore and Mary Hume Maguire agree
that the prohibitions which Coke issued against the Church courts on the ground that
their procedure was illegal dealt the crucial blow to the oath ex officio and to the High
Commission."); see also BERGER, supra note 9, at 13-14 (quoting opinion by Coke that
took position that High Commission did not have power to imprison without action by
Parliament).
123. See id. at 437 (describing a writ of prohibition). A writ of prohibition was
issued by a common law judge upon application by a defendant in an ecclesiastical
court to the ecclesiastical court. Id. at 437-438. This writ prohibited the ecclesiastical
judge from proceeding with the case on the ground that it contained temporal matters.
Id. at 438. The common law judge then held a hearing and if it was determined that
the case concerned a temporal matter, the writ stood. Id.
124. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 219 (discussing Coke's leadership in use of
writs of prohibition); see also LEv, supra note 2, at 251, 253 (noting specific uses of
prohibitions by Coke).
125. Corwin, supra note 30, at 7-8 (discussing opinion issued by Coke and
Popham, chiefjustice of King's Bench; in 1607).
126. See Randall, supra note 25, at 450 (discussing Coke's appointment to Chief
Justice of King's Bench, England's highest criminal court). In an effort to mitigate the
damage Coke was doing from his position on the Court of Common Pleas, KingJames
attempted to co-opt Coke by making him Chief Justice of England's highest criminal
court. LEw, supra note 2, at 252.
127. See LEv, supra note 2, at 253, 255 (discussing two King's Bench cases in which
Coke cited, as rule of law, principle that no man should be compelled to accuse him-
self).
128. See id. at 263 (relating that resistance to oath had been partially successful).
129. See Alford, supra note 78, at 1626 (discussing "temporary end to major contro-
versy concerning the ex officio oath"); see also LEw, supra note 2, at 262-63 (discussing
disappearance of oath as important issue between 1616 and 1633).
130. LEw, supra note 2, at 263.
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grounds that it compelled a man to convict himself with his own
testimony; rather, the entire idea of forcing a man to testify
against himself, under oath or not, came to be viewed as a viola-
tion of a basic human right."' 1 Despite this change in the con-
ception of the right, however, the use of the oath reemerged as
an issue when Archbishop William Laud took over the High
Commission in 1633.132 Laud's use of the oath was even more
aggressive than the infamousJohn Whitgift, which revitalized the
opposition that Beale, Fuller, Coke, and others had earlier
championed.13 3
In 1637, John Lilburne, a religious and political radical, was
arrested for sending seditious material into England.1
4
Lilburne, who made civil disobedience a way of life,1 35 refused to
take the oath ex officio at a preliminary examination.'3 6 At trial,
Lilburne continued to refuse the oath, and as a result, was con-
victed of contempt and subjected to five hundred lashes.' 3 7 At
his punishment, Lilburne gave an impassioned and persuasive
speech against his harsh and unjust treatment and the illegality
of the oath ex officio.'18 In response to his speech, the court or-
dered him imprisoned in one of England's worst prisons.'
3 1
Lilburne was able to get pamphlets describing his unjust trial
and treatment out of the prison 4 ° and in 1641, Parliament,1
4
'
galvanized by public opinion concerning the blatant unfairness
131. Id.
132. See Alford, supra note 78, at 1627 ("Laud revived the controversy concerning
the oath.").
133. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 15 (discussing Laud's aggressiveness and resulting
increase in public resistance to all aspects of High Commission).
134. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 216.
135. Id. at 215 (discussing Lilburne's lifelong inability to cease his political agita-
tion).
136. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 16-17 (describing Lilburne's refusal to cooperate
with pretrial procedures).
137. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 217.
138. See LEwv, supra note 2, at 276-77 (relating significant portions of Lilburne's
speech).
139. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 218 n.21.
140. LEV, supra note 2, at 277-78.
141. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 220. Parliament was called primarily because
Charles I needed funds to compensate the Scots for his unsuccessful attempt to impose
the Anglican Church on Scotland. Id. Additionally, however, Charles was in need of
funds to finance his faction in the imminent civil war. LEvy, supra note 2, at 278. With
the Scottish bloc's support, Parliament was immune from dissolution. Wolfram, supra
note 26, at 220.
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of Lilburne's trial and sentence, invalidated the Star Chamber
and the High Commission and specifically barred the use of
oaths by the ecclesiastical courts.
142
It was not until Lilburne's subsequent trial for high treason
in 1649, however, that a high English court explicitly recognized
the right against self-incrimination. 4 ' By 1700, English courts
generally accepted the principle that compelling an answer in a
criminal matter was improper.'" After over four hundred years
of development, the right against self-incrimination was estab-
lished as a fundamental principle. 45
In summary, the traditional view holds that the centuries
long battle against the oath ex officio and the power of the pre-
rogative and inquisitorial courts was the motivation for the devel-
opment of the right against self-incrimination. 146  The right
against self-incrimination began as a nebulous defense 47 to the
hated oath ex officio, simple resistance to an unjust procedure. 148
Over time, the right was asserted in increasingly sophisticated
forms by various interest groups subjected to and injured by the
use the oath, including, for example, the Crown in its attempt to
protect its sovereignty, 49 the common law courts in their at-
tempt to protect their jurisdiction, 5 ° the Catholics in their at-
142. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 220-221.
143. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 241 (quoting transcript from Lilburne's 1649
trial). Lilburne stated, "[B]y the Laws of England, I am not to answer to questions
against or concerning myself," to which Lord Keble replied, "You shall not be com-
pelled." Id.
144. 8 WIcMoRa, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 2250, at 298-300; see LEVY, supra note
2, at 325 ("By the early eighteenth century, the right prevailed supreme in all proceed-
ings with one vital exception, the preliminary examination of the suspect.").
145. See supra notes 24-144 and accompanying text (discussing development of
right against self-incrimination from first utilization of oath ex officio in 1246 until
right's general acceptance in 1700).
146. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing basic roots of right
against self-incrimination).
147. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 966 (describing "the first efforts to combat the
oath" as combining "Biblical literalism, abstract appeals to the rights of conscience, and
invocation of what Levy calls the 'initially vague [Latin] maxim' that no one should be
obliged to convict him or herself") (quoting LEVY, supra note 2, at 330).
148. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text (locating ultimate root of right
against self-incrimination in resistance to oath ex officio).
149. See supra notes 39-47 (describing early resistance by Henry III to Church's
attempt to implement what amounted to criminal courts).
150. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing common law courts'
early struggles against encroachments on their jurisdiction by ecclesiastical courts); see
also supra note 124 and accompanying text (offering example of common law courts'
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tempt to escape extermination, 51 the Puritans in their attempt
to secure religious freedom,1 52 and various political activists and
Parliament in their fight to limit prerogative rule and implement
rule-based government. 15 3 Finally, the High Commission and
the Star Chamber, with their numerous abuses and brutalities,
served as a focus for all the resistance to the oath ex officio that
had been building since 1246.154 From their inevitable demise,
the right against self-incrimination was born.1
55
B. Recent Modifications to the Traditional Historical Model of the
Development of the Right Against Self-Incrimination
In contrast to the traditional view, the more recent theory of
the development of the right against self-incrimination (or "new
view") places the right's earliest roots firmly in the ius com-
mune. 5 6 This new view also argues that the modern form of the
right did not come into being until the late eighteenth cen-
tury. 5 7 Further, the right's appearance then was only as a result
of the rise of the adversarial criminal procedure and the efforts
of defense counsel.'5 8
1. The Earliest Origin of the Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first discrepancy between the two conceptions of the
development of the right concerns the earliest origin of the
resistance to inquisitional procedures of prerogative courts in period just prior to aboli-
tion of High Commission).
151. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing claim of right against
self-incrimination by accused heretics).
152. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing formation of power-
ful new body, High Commission, to deal with Puritan threat to Crown).
153. See supra notes 112-44 and accompanying text (specifying several individuals
whose resistance to High Commission and oath ex officio were central to appearance of
articulated right against self-incrimination).
154. See supra notes 80-142 and accompanying text (describing role of High Com-
mission in development of right against self-incrimination).
155. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (summarizing traditional view
of development of right against self-incrimination).
156. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 964 (defining ius commune as merger of Ro-
man and canon laws). "[T]he ius commune itself contained a rule against forced self-
incrimination, and the earliest clear statement of the privilege in the legal life of Eng-
land sprang from this continental source rather than from the immemorial usages of
the common law." Id.
157. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1047.
158. Id.
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right. 59 The traditional view holds that the right was conceived
as an indistinct objection to the oath ex officio160 and that only as
a result of the struggle against the religious and political perse-
cution of the High Commission and the Star Chamber did the
right become an accepted aspect of common law criminal proce-
dure.' 6 ' Further, this view maintains that the sixteenth century
citation' 62 of the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, which trans-
lates as "no man is obliged to accuse himself,"1 63 was simply an
articulation of the resistance to the inquisitorial courts responsi-
ble for persecuting religious minorities in early sixteenth century
England. 164 While acknowledging that the maxim was originally
a canon law principle, 6 ' the traditional view gives the origin of
this maxim little or no weight in considering the evolution of the
right against self-incrimination. 166
Recent evidence, 67 however, demonstrates that the nemo
159. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 963-64 ("[F]ocusing ... exclusively on the
opinions of the seventeenth-century common law judges and reading them against the
backdrop of subsequent developments has resulted in a narrow and misleading account
of the origin of the privilege.").
160. See supra note 147 (describing first indistinct attempts by conscientious dis-
senters to resist use of oath).
161. See supra note 80 (describing prior historical scholarship concerning right
against self-incrimination).
162. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 1-2 (relating 1532 use of maxim byJohn Lambert in
trial for heresy). Lambert may have been reciting the writings of William Tyndale. Id.
at 64; see supra note 73 (discussing significance of Tyndale to development of right
against self-incrimination).
163. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (defining maxim of nemo tenetur).
164. See LEvv, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing 1532 heresy trial of John Lambert
and characterizing Lambert's citation of nemo tenetur maxim as afterthought).
165. See Mark Macnair, The Early Development of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 66, 67 (1990) (describing Wigmore's argument that nemo
tenetur maxim was canon law maxim used out of context in struggle against High Com-
mission).
166. See 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 296-301 (characterizing early use
of nemo tenetur as mistaken reliance on what was actually a canon law procedural rule);
see also Macnair, supra note 165, at 70 (summarizing Wigmore's position concerning
mistaken use of maxim); LEvv, supra note 2, at 329-30.
The nemo tenetur maxim had come a long way from its mysterious origins. Re-
putedly a canon-law maxim, it had never existed in any canon-law text. At best
there was the general principle in Gratian, wiped out by Innocent III, Aquinas
and the Inquisition, that no man had to come forward voluntarily to confess a
crime for which he was not even suspected.
Id.
167. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1072 (criticizing traditional view of origins of
right against self-incrimination). Langbein characterizes Helmholz's article, supra note
20, as a "devastating refutation of Leonard Levy's efforts to portray the privilege against
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tenetur maxim was an often utilized principle of the ius com-
mune." 8 Further, this maxim expressed the right against self-in-
crimination long before the right appeared in the common
law. 169 As early as the thirteenth century, the maxim is discussed
in works by influential commentators on medieval canon law.170
By the 1590's arguments were being made in the English ecclesi-
astical courts against the legality of the oath ex officio that relied
on a fully developed canonical right against self-incrimination.17'
In other words, individuals targeted by the English ecclesiastical
and prerogative courts were using thirteenth century canoni-
cally-based legal arguments to oppose the use of the oath ex of-
ficio.172
The traditional view's contention that the maxim nemo
tenetur was adopted solely as the articulation of an idea that had
developed in the common law is contradicted by the new view. 7 '
self-incrimination as an English invention intended to protect the indigenous adver-
sarial criminal procedure against incursions of European inquisitorial procedure." Id.
168. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 967 (asserting that maxim was "a common-
place[ ] taken from the traditions of the European ius commune").
169. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1072. "The concept that underlies the English
privilege against self-incrimination originated within the European tradition, as a sub-
principle of inquisitorial procedure centuries before" the right actually appeared in the
common law. Id.; see Macnair, supra note 165, at 68 (pointing out problems with idea
that "the basis of th [e] opposition [to inquisitorial procedure and the self-incriminatory
oath] was a generalization from common-law procedure"). Specifically, Macnair argues
that there was contemporary opposition to the oath ex officio on the European conti-
nent and that the sources for this opposition were probably not influenced by the Eng-
lish common law. Id. at 68-69.
170. Helmholz, supra note 20, at 967. The maxim appeared in "the most basic of
medieval guides to canon law, the glossa ordinaria to the Decretals (1234) of Pope
Gregory IX" and was later endorsed by Innocent IV and Panormitanus, who were "prob-
ably the two most influential writers on the medieval canon law." Id.
171. See id. at 969 ("[I]n litigation before the ecclesiastical courts, strong argu-
ments were being made against the oath that were based upon sources from within the
ius commune, not the English common law."). There were objections to the oath ex
officio based on Roman canon law treatises in cases in the English ecclesiastical courts
and in sixteenth and seventeenth century treatises concerning the procedure of English
ecclesiastical courts. Id. at 969-72. Further, the arguments used in these cases and trea-
tises were actually based almost exclusively on arguments from the ius commune. Id. at
972-87.
172. See id. at 969 (discussing evidence of use of Roman canon law in struggle
against oath ex officio). "[E]vidence... shows clearly that objections were being taken
regularly against the oath's validity under the law of the Church." Id. Further, the par-
ties in several late sixteenth century cases "contended that they were not compelled to
answer incriminating questions and relied upon the ius commune in articulating this
argument." Id. at 973.
173. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1072 (describing new view as "devastating refu-
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The new view argues that, in resisting an abusive inquisitorial
practice that originated in the ius commune, English lawyers and
common law courts relied on principles of the ius commune.
1 74
Therefore, the development of the right against self-incrimina-
tion is more directly related to the canonical maxim nemo tenetur
seipsum prodere, and the roman-canon law in general, than the
traditional view acknowledges. 175 Despite the likelihood that the
right originated in the ius commune and was only later adopted in
England,176 much of the traditional view of the later events re-
mains valid, 177 particularly the argument that the struggle
against the oath ex officio was directly responsible for the expan-
sion of the right as a result of the English constitutional struggles
in the mid-seventeenth century.
178
2. The Rise of the Adversarial Criminal System and the Role
of Defense Counsel
Another objection to the traditional view is that the right
could not possibly have gained wide acceptance by 1700179 be-
cause the procedural framework of the time simply did not allow
tation" of traditional view). The evidence "shows clearly that objections to the... use
of the ex officio oath were taken initially on the ground that the ex officio oath was con-
trary to the letter of the Roman canon law, not on the basis of supposed rights of con-
science or as derived from Magna Carta or as a common law invention, as Levy's ac-
count suggests." Helmholz, supra note 20, at 969.
174. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1072 (stating that Helmholz's article, supra
note 20, "established that the nemo tenatur [sic] maxim influenced practice in English
ecclesiastical courts long before anybody in England started complaining about Star
Chamber or the Court of High Commission").
175. See supra note 169 (discussing origin of right against self-incrimination in ius
commune).
176. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 988 ("The oft-repeated maxim nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum clearly came from canonical sources.").
177. See id. at 989-90 (acknowledging that, despite his argument concerning the
greater role of the ius commune in the development of the right against self-incrimina-
tion, "[n]one of the evidence presented here means that we owe the modern privilege
against self-incrimination directly to the Roman and canon laws. The privilege became
a part of our law because the common lawyers took up its cause, embraced and ex-
panded it"); see also id. at 967. "The broad outlines of Levy's account are compelling
and correct." Id.; see Langbein, supra note 19, at 1083 ("The nemo tenatur [sic] slogan
did indeed gain currency during the Tudor-Stuart constitutional struggles.").
178. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing struggle against oath ex
officio as main reason for development of right against self-incrimination).
179. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing general acceptance
of right against self-incrimination after second trial ofJohn Lilburne in 1649); see also
LEwiS MAYrm, SHALL WE AMEND THE FtVrH AMENDMENT? 15 (1959) (describing process
of slow acceptance and expansion of right after Lilburne trial).
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a defendant to assert the right with any hope of proving his inno-
cence.180 More specifically, not until the defendant could rely
on counsel to speak for him could he risk asserting his right
against self-incrimination.' 8 ' Thus, the modem version of the
right did not appear until the late eighteenth century, when the
reformation of the criminal trial procedure was essentially com-
plete.182
The specific procedural facets of the seventeenth century
criminal system that prevented a defendant from claiming the
right against self-incrimination included the denial of access to
defense counsel,18 3 the restrictions on defense witnesses,' the
unarticulated state of any prosecutorial standard of proof, 85 the
frustration of defensive trial preparation, 186 the harsh pretrial
procedure,18 7 and the sentencing purposes of the trial.'88 These
180. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1048 (stating that several characteristics of
early modem criminal procedure combined to prevent right against self-incrimination
from developing until early eighteenth century).
181. See id. at 1048-49 (discussing need for defense-by-proxy for right against self-
incrimination to function). Langbein asserts that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimi-
nation at common law was the work of defense counsel." Id. at 1047.
182. Id. "[T]he true origins of the common law privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] are to be found not in the high politics of the English revolution, but in the rise of
adversary criminal procedure at the end of the eighteenth century."
183. See id. at 1054. If the accused did not speak, no one would, and he would
undoubtedly be found guilty. Id. "The right to remain silent when no one else can
speak for you is simply the right to slit your throat. . . ." Id.
184. Id. at 1055-56. The restriction on defense witnesses, one of the first limita-
tions to be corrected, held that, if allowed at all, defense witnesses could not testify
upon oath. Id. Thus, if the defendant could not call anyone to testify on his behalf or
if his witnesses were testifying unsworn, the defendant was much more likely to testify
himself. Id.
185. Id. at 1056-57. Because the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
did not yet exist, a prisoner could not expect the jury to probe the prosecution's case
and was therefore forced to do it himself. Id.
186. Id. at 1057-58. The defendant was detained prior to trial, denied assistance of
counsel, refused contact with defense witnesses and prohibited from acquiring a copy
of the charges against him. Id. at 1058-59.
187. Id. at 1059-62. The pretrial procedure, which in any legal system is the most
important aspect of a criminal case, was tilted heavily against the defendant until well
into the eighteenth century. Id. at 1059-61. In other words, the accused was forced to
incriminate himself as a regular pre-trial practice. Id. at 1061. "If he refused to testify
at trial .... the pretrial statement would be used against him." Id.
188. Id. at 1062-65. An accused's only hope of influencing a jury and thus ob-
taining a lesser sentence was to favorably impress the jury by pleading his case well, a
possibility which was greatly diminished by the other procedural factors working against
him. Id. at 1062-64.
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procedures combined to force the defendant to speak.189 As the
role of the defense counsel increased and the adversarial system
matured, however, these procedures were slowly replaced or be-
came irrelevant, and the right against self-incrimination became
available to a criminal defendant.1 90
These changes in procedure are aspects of a more signifi-
cant change in the basic philosophy of criminal prosecution. 9'
The criminal trial evolved from requiring the accused to prove,
through affirmative efforts, that he is innocent, to a procedure
where the prosecution must prove the defendant guilty and the
defendant is responsible only for challenging the prosecution's
case. 19 2  The right against self-incrimination, in its modern
form, resulted from this change in procedure. 9
C. The Changing Relationship Between the Corporation and the State
The corporation 194 was originally viewed as existing solely by
permission of the state, a view that entailed a clear relationship
between the state and the corporate entity.1 95 As the corpora-
tion became more common in economic life, this conception of
the corporation fell into disfavor and new theories of corporate
personality gained currency, redefining the corporate/state rela-
189. See id. at 1066 (asserting that procedural hurdles "left the typical defendant
with little alternative but to conduct his own defense").
190. See id. at 1069. "Across these decades, defense counsel broke up the 'accused
speaks' trial. In these developments we find not only the beginnings of a new theory of
trial, but also the real origins of the privilege against self incrimination." Id.
191. See id. at 1069 (discussing change in criminal trial philosophy).
192. See id. at 1047-48 (discussing change in criminal trial procedure).
193. See id. at 1065-66 (stating that there are many reasons for doubting traditional
view of development of right against self-incrimination).
The key insight, however, is that the slogan [nemo tenetur) did not make the
privilege; it was the privilege, which developed much later, that absorbed and
perpetuated the slogan. The ancestry of the privilege has been mistakenly
projected backwards upon the slogan, whereas the privilege against self-in-
crimination in common law criminal procedure was, in truth, the achievement
of defense counsel in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Id. at 1083.
194. See LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY, MATERLUS
AND PROBLEMS 1 (1982) (defining corporation as "an association of individuals, organ-
ized to further a common purpose, and possessing a combination of attributes (e.g.,
continuity of existence, limited liability, separate legal entity, centralized management
and transferability of interests) which distinguishes the corporation from other associa-
tions").
195. Mark, supra note 22, at 1441.
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tionship.196 This redefinition resulted in the corporation being
increasingly perceived as an independent actor in modern soci-
ety.197 As the corporation has continued to grow in importance,
government regulation, especially regulation that may result in
monetary or criminal penalty, has increased exponentially. 98
Originally, a corporation could be created only by a sover-
eign's grant.' 99 This grant, termed a charter, created the corpo-
ration and completely defined and limited its powers. 20 0  Be-
cause all corporate powers flowed from the charter granted by
the sovereign, the relationship between the state and the corpo-
ration was clear: the state had considerable control over the cor-
poration.2 0 ' By the early nineteenth century, this view had
evolved slightly, with legal scholars beginning to perceive the
creation of a corporation as a contract between the corporation
and the state. 02 Such a conception of the corporate entity was
important because the corporation was beginning to be recog-
nized as separate from the state.203
196. See id. at 1441-42 (discussing modifications to theory of corporate personal-
ity).
197. See id. at 1470 (stating that "corporations obtained their political and thus
legal status independently from the state" as a result of realist theory).
198. See Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Crim-
inal Liability, 49 Bus. LAw. 617, 618 (1994) (noting recent increase in criminal convic-
tions of corporations).
199. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspec-
tives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1484 (1989) ("Corporate doctrine, as received
from Great Britain, held that the corporate form was instituted by the sovereign's grant
of a charter."); see also Case of Sutton's Hosp., 5 Co. Rep. 253, 305 (KB. 1613) (Eng.)
("None but the King alone can create or make a corporation.").
200. See Bratton, supra note 199, at 1504-05 (discussing concession or fiction the-
ory); see also Mark, supra note 22, at 1444-45 (discussing state's limitation of U.S. corpo-
rations before 1880). This section concentrates on the history of corporate legal theory
in the United States because "[e]arly American corporate law was more extensive and
more highly developed than any in contemporary Europe." Bratton, supra note 199, at
1485.
201. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(Marshall, CJ.) (finding that private corporation "possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence"); see also Mark, supra note 22, at 1450 (discussing limitations in charters as
means of protection for public).
202. See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 637-38 (discussing contractual nature of incor-
poration).
203. See Mark, supra note 22, at 1452 ("The contract theory of incorporation devel-
oped in Dartmouth College was clearly designed to limit the state's ability to interfere
with the operations of the corporation."). The corporation, however, was still viewed as
deriving its power from the state. See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 685-86 (discussing
sovereign as originator of corporations) (Story, J.).
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By the late nineteenth century, the corporate form was
much more common. 20 4 This proliferation was the result of gen-
eral incorporation laws, which changed incorporation from a
legislative matter to an administrative and procedural one,
thereby undercutting the concession theory.205 As the conces-
sion theory lost its viability, the contractual, or partnership, con-
ception of the corporate entity came into currency. 20 6 This the-
ory held that a corporation was based entirely on the agreement
of the parties who formed the corporation, a view that further
emphasized the independence of corporations from the state.2 °7
Finally, with the rise of the managerial corporation, the in-
adequacy of the partnership theory became apparent.0 8 The
partnership theory failed to accurately reflect the contemporary
corporate entity because it ignored the inherent value of the im-
mortality of the corporate entity and the rapidly decreasing role
of the incorporators whose agreement to incorporate was sup-
posedly so central.2°  As a result, this theory declined in impor-
tance, prompting the corporate bar to enter into a long and spir-
ited debate regarding the proper theory of the corporate en-
tity.210 From this debate emerged the realism theory of the
corporate entity, which defined the corporation as an intricate
system of productive organization. 11
Finally, around 1930, the theory of corporate realism was
discredited as well. 12 From approximately 1930 until recently,
the corporate form has been regarded as a bundle of interests in
204. Bratton, supra note 199, at 1485.
205. Mark, supra note 22, at 1454-55 (discussing change in incorporation process);
see Bratton, supra note 199, at 1485 (discussing general corporation laws).
206. See Mark, supra note 22, at 1457 (discussing rise of partnership view after
1880).
207. See id. at 1455 (noting that growing corporate autonomy was partly result of
failure of concession theory); see also id. at 1459 (stating that, after rise of contract
theory, it was "clear that individuals, not the state, empowered corporations").
208. See id. at 1464-65 (discussing problems with partnership theory).
209. Id. By the early twentieth century, a class of professional managers was mak-
ing all important decisions, a circumstance for which the partnership theory simply
could not account. See Bratton, supra note 199, at 1475-76 (discussing rise of manageri-
alism).
210. See Mark, supra note 22, at 1465-68 (discussing debate that eventually gave
rise to realism theory). This debate was based on both Continental and Anglo-Ameri-
can sources. Id. at 1465-66.
211. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining realism theory of corporate
personality).
212. Bratton, supra note 199, at 1491.
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a unique business structure.2 13 This new theory did not discredit
the concept that a corporation was an independent, autono-
mous entity, however, and this view survives today. t4
As the corporation gained independence from the state, the
state substituted legislative regulation for the charter limitations
of an earlier era.215 Eventually this independence, and the mis-
conduct it sometimes engendered, created a social movement
against criminal corporate conduct.2 16 This movement has in
turn resulted in a marked increased in the prosecution and pun-
ishment of corporations in numerous fields. 1 7
II. A CORPORATION'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
UNDER U.S., AUSTRALIAN, AD EUROPEAN UNION LAW
In Hale v. Henkel,218 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the
issue of whether the right against self-incrimination is available
to a corporation.219  The U.S. Supreme Court found that the
right did not develop to protect corporations, which were enti-
213. See Mark, supra note 22, at 1481 (discussing conceptual view of corporate
form after decline of realism theory); see also Bratton, supra note 199, at 1491 (discuss-
ing disappearance of debate of nature of firm in traditional legal terms).
214. See Mark, supra note 22, at 1483.
The corporation, once the derivative tool of the state, had become its rival,
and the successes of autonomous corporate management turned the basis for
belief in an individualist conception of property on its head. The protests of
modern legists notwithstanding, the business corporation had become the
quintessential economic man.
Id.; see id. at 1442 (discussing continued existence of convention that corporation is
legal person).
215. See id. at 1442 (stating that after concession theory was discredited, "[t]he
states chose to abandon their attempts to regulate corporations through their charters
and sought instead to regulate harmful activities, regardless of the form of the eco-
nomic enterprise").
216. See Steven C. Bennett, Developments in the Movement Against Corporate Crime, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 871, 873-75 (1990) (reviewing FRANcis T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE
CRIME UNDER A-rAcic THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND (1987)) (discussing social
movement against criminal corporation).
217. See id. at 879 (discussing increased prosecution for workplace safety violations
since 1980, particularly in California); see also Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Pun-
ishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv.
247, 274 (1991) (displaying statistics showing large increase in number of antitrust pros-
ecutions and increase in criminal fines for antitrust violations); Sidney M. Wolf, Finding
An Environmental Felon Under the Corporate Veil: The Responsible Corporate Officer Docrine
and RCRA, 9J. LAND USE & ENvrT.. L. 1, 1 (1993) (discussing increased criminalization
of environmental offenses).
218. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
219. See id. at 74 (finding that "there is a clear distinction ... between an individ-
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ties existing solely as the result of state power,220 and that al-
lowing this right to corporations would make enforcement of
certain governmental regulations infeasible.221 In contrast, Aus-
tralia's High Court only recently determined that the right was
unavailable to a corporation. 22 2 The High Court based its deci-
sion on a broad survey of the existing common law and the his-
torical and modem reasons for the development and existence
of the right.2 2 3 Lastly, the European Union decided in 1989 that
a corporation does have the right to refuse to give answers which
would incriminate itself.2 24 The right was held to be one of sev-
eral basic "rights of defence" (hereinafter "rights of defence")
and consequently considered more important than the govern-
ment's need to obtain information. 5
A. The U.S. Treatment of a Corporation's Right
Against Self-Incrimination
In the United States, the issue of whether a corporation can
successfully claim a right against self-incrimination was settled
nearly ninety years ago by Hale v. Henkel.226 Henkel's basic hold-
ing, that the Fifth Amendment is a personal right that is unavail-
able to a corporation,227 has since undergone some modifica-
tion, including a reworking of its policy justifications 22 and an
ual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for an examination at the suit of the state").
220. See id. at 74-75 (discussing corporation ,as "a creature of the state").
221. See id. (discussing difficulty in enforcing anti-trust laws if corporation was al-
lowed to claim right against self-incrimination).
222. See Environment Protection Agency v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392,
412 (1993) (Austl.) (holding that right against self-incrimination is not available at com-
mon-law in Australia).
223. See id. at 397-404 (examining treatment of right against self-incrimination in
United States, England, Canada, and New Zealand and modem justifications).
224. See Orkem SA v Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3351, 35
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502, 556 (holding that Commission investigation cannot undermine
rights of defence and therefore corporation cannot be compelled to provide informa-
tion which would incriminate it).
225. Id. at 3351, 33-34, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 556.
226. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
227. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 69, 74. Initially, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was personal and that the subpoenaed corporate officer
could therefore not assert the corporation's right against self-incrimination. Id. at 69.
The Court went on to say that there was "a clear distinction between an individual and a
corporation" and that the corporation itself had no Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 74.
228. See White, 322 U.S. at 700-01 (abandoning state's visitorial powers as justifica-
tion for denying right against self-incrimination to corporations); see also Bellis, 417 U.S.
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expansion of its application to encompass unions,22 9 political or-
ganizations, 23 0 and partnerships.2 3 1 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has used the holding as the basis for significantly limiting
the application of the right against self-incrimination for anyone
employed by a corporation. 32 Through all of this, however, the
Court has left the conclusion that a corporation has no right
against self-incrimination unchanged.33
Henkel involved a subpoena issued for some of a corpora-
tion's books and documents at the grand jury stage of an anti-
trust investigation.2 3 4 The subpoena was issued to a corporate
officer who was himself protected by a statutory grant of immu-
nity.2 35 The officer argued that this immunity was not enough to
protect the corporation, and attempted to resist the subpoena
based on the corporation's right against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment.23 6
The Court in Henkel disagreed with this contention, holding
that it was improper for three reasons.237 First, the Court held
that under the Fifth Amendment the right against self-incrimina-
tion was a personal one and thus the officer could not claim the
at 91-92 (citing protection of natural person's privacy as important justification for ap-
plying right and finding that this rationale did not apply to corporations).
229. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). The Court in White
based this denial of the right against self-incrimination entirely on the personal nature
of the right, id. at 698-99, and the detrimental effect on the state's power to regulate
organizations. Id. at 700.
230. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (denying right
against self-incrimination to Communist Party of Denver).
231. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93 (1974) (denying right against self-
incrimination to former partner of dissolved law partnership). Once again, the Court
based its decision on the personal nature of the right against self-incrimination, id. at
89-90, but noted that the right is also important in protecting an individual's privacy.
Id. at 91-92. The Court went on to find that a partnership shared enough of the charac-
teristics of a collective entity as to preclude the application of the right against self-
incrimination. Id. at 93-94.
232. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1987). The Court denied the
right against self-incrimination to the sole shareholder and president of a close corpora-
tion simply because he incorporated his business, despite recognizing that if the share-
holder had operated his business as a sole proprietorship, he would have been pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment. Id.
233. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90.
234. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 44-45.
235. Id. at 46.
236. See id. at 69 (discussing defendant's argument that "while the immunity stat-
ute may protect the individual witnesses, it would not protect the corporation of which
appellant was the agent and representative").
237. See id. at 69-74 (detailing Court's reasoning).
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corporation's right for it.23 8 Second, it cited the difficulty in en-
forcing the Sherman Act if a corporation could claim the right
against self-incrimination. 239 Finally, the Court found that the
corporation owed its entire existence to the state, and that its
rights and privileges were a function of the state's grant.
2 40
Therefore, according to the Court, to allow a corporation to use
the Fifth Amendment to shield its actions from the state, which
had granted it the right to perform any actions at all, would be
an anomaly.241
The central holding in Henkel has subsequently been ex-
panded to include unincorporated organizations.242 Now
known as the collective entity doctrine, 43 the rule has been the
basis for limiting the scope of the right against self-incrimina-
tion, including, for example, denying the right to anyone hold-
ing a corporation's documents in a representative capacity.
244
238. Id. at 69. This objection is particularly important because a corporation, as a
juristic person, must act through agents, and thus would never be able to assert its right
against self-incrimination for any court room testimony. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 58
(discussing Henkel Court's assertion that agents can not claim privilege for corpora-
tion).
239. See Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74.
If, whenever an officer or employee of a corporation were summoned before a
grand jury as a witness he could refuse to produce the books and documents
of such corporation, upon the ground that they would incriminate the corpo-
ration itself, it would result in the failure of a large number of cases where the
illegal combination was determinable only upon the examination of such pa-
pers.
Id.
240. Id. at 74-75.
241. Id. at 75. The Court went on to cite the Congress' right to regulate com-
merce as the grounds for allowing the federal government to stand in the shoes of New
Jersey's government for purposes of inspection of the New Jersey corporation's books
and records. Id. The Court did state that the federal government did not have a "gen-
eral visitatorial power over the state corporations." Id.
242. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (listing various collective enti-
ties that have been denied right against self-incrimination, including unions, political
organizations, and partnerships). '
243. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 ("[W]e have long recognized that, for the pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated
differently from individuals. This doctrine - known as the collective entity rule - has
a lengthy and distinguished pedigree."). The rule, although derived directly from Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906), was first enunciated in White v. United States, 322 U.S.
694, 699 (1944).
244. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 ("[A]n individual cannot rely upon
the privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective entity which are in his pos-
session in a representative capacity, even if these records might incriminate him person-
ally."); see aLso Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911) (denying right
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The Supreme Court has held that to allow an individual who
possesses a collective entity's documents in a representative ca-
pacity to successfully assert the right against self-incrimination
would be tantamount to allowing the right to the collective en-
tity, which, pursuant to Henkel, does not possess such a right.2 4 5
The Supreme Court's reasoning for denying the right
against self-incrimination to corporations has changed over
time, including abandoning the corporate personality justifica-
tion originally cited in Henkel.24 6 The Court has also placed in-
creased reliance on the adverse effect that allowing a corporate
right against self-incrimination would have on the state's police
powers.2 47 Finally, the Court has recognized the role of privacy
in the determination of whether the right against self-incrimina-
tion is applicable and found that this concern is not implicated
in collective entity cases.248
B. Australia's Treatment of a Corporation's Right
Against Self-Incrimination
In contrast to its long, rather complicated history in the
against self-incrimination to corporate officer despite argument that corporate papers
actually incriminated corporate officer); supra note 232 and accompanying text
(describing Court's denial of right to sole shareholder in corporation based on original
holding in Henkel).
245. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110 (discussing application of Fifth Amendment to
corporate record holders). Compare, for example, Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104, where the
sole shareholder of a corporation was denied the right against self-incrimination based
on his representative capacity, with United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606, 617 (1984),
where a sole proprietor was allowed to claim the right.
246. See White, 322 U.S. at 700. The Court in White stated that the state's visitorial
rights over an incorporated entity were simply a "convenient vehicle for justification of
governmental investigation of corporate books and records" and that incorporation was
not required to deny an organization the right against self-incrimination. Id. In con-
trast, one of the Court's main justifications for its decision in Henkel was the nature of
corporate entities and the fact that they existed only at the whim of the state. Henkel,
201 U.S. at 74-75; see supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing corporation
as creature of state justification).
247. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115-16.
The greater portion of the evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its
representatives is usually found in the official records and documents of that
organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these im-
personal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and
state laws would be impossible.
Id. at 115 (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 700).
248. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-92 (discussing importance of pri-
vacy to application of Fifth Amendment).
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United States, 249 the issue of whether the right against self-in-
crimination is available to a corporation was decided in Australia
in 1993 by Environment Protection Agency v. Caltex Refining Co..25°
The Australian High Court, because it was confronted with an
issue of first impression in Australia, performed an in-depth sur-
vey and analysis of the state ofthe law concerning a corpora-
tion's right against self-incrimination.2 5 1 The Court reviewed the
common law precedents on the issue, 2  examined the U.S. ap-
proach,2 5 3 evaluated the historical development of the right
against self-incrimination,2 54 and analyzed the modern rationale
for the privilege, 55 finally determining that the right is not avail-
able to corporations.256
Caltex Refining held a license that allowed it to discharge a
certain amount of pollutants a year into the ocean.257 In March
1990 Caltex was accused of violating certain conditions of this
license and the Environmental Protection Authority, pursuant to
its statutory powers, served the company with a notice to pro-
duce. 5 Caltex then moved to have the notice to produce de-
clared invalid as a violation of its privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.25 9 The lower court rejected this contention, but on appeal,
the Court of Criminal Appeal invalidated the production order,
holding that corporations have a legitimate right against self-in-
249. See supra notes 226-48 and accompanying text (discussing application of right
to corporations by U.S. Supreme Court between Henkel in 1906 and Braswell in 1988).
250. 118 A.L.R. 392, 405 (1993) (Austl.).
251. See id. at 398.
As there is no Australian authority determinative of the issue, it is appropriate
to examine the rationales for the privilege (both historical and modem) and
also to review the judicial decisions in other common law jurisdictions with a
view to determining whether, in Australia, the privilege should apply to corpo-
rations, at least in relation to production of documents.
Id.
252. See id. at 400-03 (reviewing state of law concerning corporation's right against
self-incrimination in England, Canada, and New Zealand).
253. See id. at 398-400 (discussing U.S. approach to corporation's right against
self-incrimination).
254. See id. at 403-04 (examining history of right against self-incrimination).
255. See id. at 404-10 (discussing modem rationales for right against self-incrimina-
tion).
256. See id. at 411. The Court concluded that "if it ever was the common law of
Australia that corporations could claim the privilege against self-incrimination in rela-
tion to production of documents, it is no longer the common law." Id. at 412.
257. Id. at 397.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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crimination..2 6  The High Court then granted review. 261
In rejecting the extension of the right against self-incrimina-
tion to corporate entities, the High Court found that the privi-
lege was, at its most essential, a human right, protecting the ac-
cused from treatment that could only be suffered by a human
being.262 Additionally, the Court recognized the importance of
the right in maintaining a correct balance between the state and
the accused, but concluded that, because a corporation is in an
inherently better position than an individual in terms of main-
taining this balance, the right was unnecessary for corpora-
tions.263 Particularly indicative of the corporation's better posi-
tion vis-a-vis the state, according to the Court, was the difficulty
the state had in discovering and proving a criminal violation by
the corporation.2 64 Finally, the High Court repudiated the argu-
ment that the right against self-incrimination is so fundamental
that the denial of the right to corporations would undermine
the foundations of the accusatorial system of criminal justice.265
The Court maintained that, in light of the legislature's frequent
interference with the common law right against self-incrimina-
tion, especially as applied to corporations, this argument was
misplaced.266 The Court found that such interference only con-
firms that a corporation's right against self-incrimination is not
basic to the accusatorial system.267
260. Caltex Refining Co. v. State Pollution Control Commission, [1991] 25
N.S.W.L.R. 118 (Ct.CrimApp.) (Austi.).
261. Environment Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392, 392
(1993) (Austi.).
262. See id. at 404. The High Court stated that the right against self-incrimination
is " 'a human right, based on the desire to protect personal freedom and human dig-
nity.' " Id. (quoting Rochfort v. Trade Practices Commission, (1982) 153 C.L.R. 134,
150 (Austl.)). Further, the Court cites to the ICCPR, supra note 4, S. TREATr Doc. No.
95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, as further proof that the right is viewed as a strictly human right.
Id. at 405.
263. See id. at 406 (discussing fair balance between state and corporation).
264. Id. (citing complex structure and greater resources of corporations as reasons
for better position).
265. Id. at 407-08 (discussing argument concerning fundamental nature of right
against self-incrimination).
266. Id. at 408 (stating, without giving specific examples, that "legislatures have
from time to time in different fields abrogated or interfered with the privilege in many
of its aspects, including its application to the productions of documents").
267. Id. at 409. "Indeed, the extent to which statute has interfered with the privi-
lege in relation to corporations indicates that the privilege, at least in so far as it relates
to production of corporate documents, is not a fundamental aspect of the accusatorial
criminal justice system." Id.
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C. The European Union's Treatment of a Corporation's Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The European Union's approach to a corporation's right
against self-incrimination is unique among the three jurisdic-
tions."'8 The seminal European Union case, Orkem SA v. Commis-
sion, explicitly recognizes a corporation's right against self-in-
crimination.2 "9 The right is based on the European Union's
rights of defence rather than in the civil or common law or in
the historical development of the right against self-incrimina-
tion.270 These rights of defence, which the European Court of
Justice2 71 has recognized as a collective fundamental principle of
Community law,272 have developed as a result of the European
Union's competition policy.2 75
The European Union's competition policy is implemented
pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. 74 These arti-
cles, which regulate agreements and concerted actions by corpo-
268. See supra notes 226-67 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. and Australian
approach to corporation's right against self-incrimination). The U.S. and Australian
approaches, because they are both common-law based legal systems, delve deeper into
the history of the right or depend more on previously decided cases. See supra notes
252-55 and accompanying text (describing process used by Australian High Court to
decide issue of whether right against self-incrimination should apply to corporation);
see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105-08 (1988) (tracing lineage of collec-
tive entity rule from Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
269. Orkem SA v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R 502.
270. See Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. at 3351, 32-35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 556 (discuss-
ing corporation's rights of defence).
271. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ELEANOR M.
Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 69-72 (1993) (discussing
Court of Justice as institution). The Court of Justice decides issues concerning the le-
gality of actions by both European Community institutions and the Member States of
the European Community. Id. at 69.
272. NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81,
[1983] E.C.R. 3461, 3498, 1 7, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 318.
273. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 271, at 698 ("[Mluch of the Community law
on procedural rights is to be found in competition cases.").
274. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 85, 86,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 626-28, [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLSH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrFIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off., 1987).
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rations and prohibit abuse of dominant market position,2 7 5 are
enforced according to Regulation 17,276 which gives the Com-
mission 2 " broad investigatory and enforcement powers.278
Much of the Union law on procedural rights has evolved out of
disputes concerning the limits of these broad investigative pow-
ers. 2 79 These procedural rights include, for example, the right
to a fair hearing280 and the right to be apprised of all documents
275. EC Treaty, supra note 274, arts. 85(1) and 86. Article 85 prohibits "all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between member-States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market." Id. art. 85(1). Article 86 states that "(a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between member-States." Id. art. 86.
276. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
1962, at 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
277. See EC Treaty, supra note 274, art. 155. The Commission of the European
Communities enforces the provisions of the European Community Treaty according to
Article 155, which states:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common
market, the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the insti-
tutions pursuant thereto are applied;
formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures
taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner pro-
vided for in this Treaty;
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation
of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id.
278. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 271, at 632 ("Regulation 17 also authorizes
broad investigative procedures."). For example, Article 11 (1) of Regulation 17 states
that "the Commission may obtain all necessary information from the governments and
competent authorities of the Member States and from undertakings and associations of
undertakings." Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 276, art. 11(1), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-1962, at 90. Similarly, Article 14 of Regulation 17 provides that "the Commis-
sion may undertake all necessary investigations into undertakings and associations of
undertakings." Id. art. 14(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-1962, at 91. Article 14(1) specifi-
cally provides that "to examine the books and other business records; to take copies of
or extracts from the books and business records; to ask for oral explanations on the
spot; to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings." Id.
279. See, e.g., Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87, 227/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2859, 2928,1 36, [1991] 1 C.E.C (CCH) 280, 296 (allowing warrantless search of
business because it "did not exceed [the Commission's] powers under Article 14 of
Regulation No. 17."); AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R.
1575, 1610-11, 11 18-21, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264, 322-23 (finding that right to legal
counsel and confidentiality of attorney/client communications were basic rights).
280. See Musique Diffusion Francaise SA v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-03/80,
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and facts upon which a Commission decision relies. 81 Collec-
tively, these rights constitute the rights of defence, 82 and they
have been held to apply to all administrative procedures before
the Commission. 83
In Orkem,284 the Commission was investigating suspected
polyethylene and PVC cartels. 85 Although Article 11 of Regula-
tion 17 gives the Commission the right to request information
concerning such investigations,286 Orkem resisted, 87 claiming
that to supply the requested information would be to incrimi-
nate itself by essentially confessing to violations of the competi-
[1983] E.C.R. 1825, 1880-81, 11 8-10, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 315 (stating that there is
"fundamental principle of Community law which requires the right to a fair hearing to
be observed in all proceedings, even those of an administrative nature"). The Court
also found the right to notification to be part of the right to a fair hearing. Id. at 1880-
81, 1 9-10, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 315.
281. See Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 512-
513, It 11-14, [1979] 3 C.M.LR. 211, 268-69. This right dictates that if the Commis-
sion cannot disclose such supporting documents or facts because they are confidential
business secrets of third parties, then the Commission may not rely on the documents
or facts in its prosecution of any alleged violations. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 271, at
699.
282. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 271, at 699 (discussing procedural rights that
comprise rights of defence). The Court of Justice has also held that, so long as the
communications "emanate from independent lawyers" and are "in the interest of the
client's rights of defence," the right to legal representation and the confidentiality of
lawyer/client communications are rights of defence. AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1611,
(1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 323. AM&S was particularly important to the Orkem decision be-
cause it recognized that the Commission's broad investigative powers under Regulation
17 "do not exclude the possibility of recognizing, subject to certain conditions, that
certain business records are of a confidential nature." AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1610,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 322; see supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (discussing
Commission's investigative powers under Regulation 17). In other words, the investiga-
tive powers of the Commission can be limited by the rights of defence. AM&S, [1982]
E.C.R. at 1610, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 322.
283. Musique, [1983] E.C.R. at 1880, 8, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. at 315.
284. Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
502.
285. William Snyder, Due Process in the European Economic Community: Rights of Busi-
nesses During Commission Inspections, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 955, 961 (1991).
286. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 276, art. 11(1), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-1962, at 90. Article 11 states, in part, that "the Commission may obtain all
necessary information from ... undertakings." See supra note 278 (describing proce-
dures allowed by Article 11).
287. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. at 3285, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 506.. The Commission
requested information concerning meetings of polyethylene producers, including
where and when, and any evidence of agreements to fix prices or establish quotas. Sny-
der, supra note 285, at 961.
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tion regulations. 288 The Court agreed, finding that limitations
on the Commission's investigatory powers are implied by the
need to maintain the rights of defence as a fundamental princi-
ple of the Community legal order.289 The Court of Justice did
recognize that the power to investigate was vital to the Commis-
sion's role in regulating competition in the European Union
and held that, in this case, this power was not limited by Regula-
tion 17, by any European Union agreements, or by the law of the
Member States.29 ° The Court went on to find, however, that a
corporation's right against self-incrimination is a right of de-
fence and thus a fundamental principle of law in the European
Union.2 9 1 Therefore, the importance of the Commission's inter-
ests notwithstanding, the right could not be infringed upon. 92
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SCOPE OF
A CORPORATION'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The revisions to the history of the development of the right
against self-incrimination make it clear that the right did not de-
velop simply as protection for the individual.298 In light of this
conclusion, the most tenable justification for the modem appli-
cation of the right is the right's importance in maintaining an
equitable balance of power between the state and its citizens. In
the past, however, the corporation was in a better position than a
natural person in terms of maintaining such a balance,294 and
288. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. at 3348, 18, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 553-54.
289. See id. at 3351, 1 32-35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 556 (setting forth reasoning
employed by Court in balancing Commission's right to compel necessary information
against Orkem's rights of defence).
290. See id. at 3350-51, 7 26-31, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 555-56 (discussing Commis-
sion's investigation).
291. Id. at 3351, 32-35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 556.
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 156-93 and accompanying text (discussing recent modification
to theory of historical development of right against self-incrimination).
294. See Case of Sutton's Hosp., 5 Co. Rep. 253, 303 (KB. 1613) (holding that
corporations cannot be outlawed because they "rest only in the intendment and consid-
eration of the law"); see also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944) (discussing
difficulty in obtaining evidence against corporation). Additionally, corporations have
greater resources as well as advantages flowing from incorporation. Environment Pro-
tection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392, 406 (1993) (Austl.). But see
HESSEN, supra note 293, at 15-22 (critiquing view that corporation receives special bene-
fits from state). Hessen argues that entity status and perpetual duration, two of the
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this justification was therefore used to support the denial of the
right to corporations.29 5  This balance of power has recently
been altered by the introduction and proliferation of criminal
and regulatory codes that may result in criminal liability for the
corporation and its officers. 9 6 The increased ability of the state
to successfully punish corporate misbehavior has skewed a previ-
ously equitable balance of power in the state's favor,2 97 requiring
a reexamination of the U.S. and Australian approaches, which
fail to reflect this change in the balance of power. 98 In contrast,
the European Union's approach successfully maintains an equi-
table balance between the state's need to protect itself and its
citizens and the corporation's rights, and should serve as a
model for remedying the other jurisdictions' treatment of the
* 299issue.
A. The Policy Justifications for Applying or Denying the Right
Against Self-Incrimination to Corporations
The various policy justifications that the U.S., Australian
and European Union courts relied on in applying or denying
the right against self-incrimination to corporations are based
either on the right's alleged status as a strictly human right or on
the courts' concern with maintaining an equitable balance of
three main benefits of incorporation, are available to other business forms as well. Id.
at 16-17. The third benefit, limited liability, is simply an implied contractual clause of
the articles of incorporation. Id. at 18-21.
295. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 406 ("[W~e reject without hesitation the suggestion
that the availability of the privilege to corporations achieves or would achieve a correct
balance of power between State and corporation.").
296. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1993);
Wolf, supra note 217, at 2-3 (discussing expanded criminalization of environmental vio-
lations, including increased penalties).
297. See Webb, supra note 198, at 618. Over the past twenty years, federal criminal
convictions of corporations have gone from a few dozen a year to over 300. Id.; see id. at
617-19 (discussing increase in criminal and regulatory investigations and prosecutions).
This increase in prosecution of corporations has been termed "staggering." Id. at 618.
298. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 406. The Australian High Court relied on the sup-
posed difficulty in policing corporations as a reason for denying the right against self-
incrimination to corporations. Id.; see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988)
(stating that allowing corporations right against self-incrimination "would have a detri-
mental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the
most serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities").
299. See Orkem SA v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3350-51, 11
26-35, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 502, 555-56 (discussing balancing of state's interest and corpo-
ration's rights of defence).
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power.300 The humanity-based arguments contend that the right
against self-incrimination developed as a result of the historical
abuses suffered by human beings, and that the only reason for
allowing the right to continue to thwart the state's legitimate in-
terest in having all available information is to avoid these
abuses.301 The equitable balance-of-power arguments, on the
other hand, maintain that the right against self-incrimination is
simply a mechanism for preventing the state from using its
nearly unlimited power to abuse its citizens in the name of the
majority's well-being.30°
The humanity-based justifications, including the "cruel
trilemma" argument,303 the prevention of mental and physical
torture,30 4 and the respect of the accused's privacy, 0 ' should no
longer be seen as justification for the denial of the right against
self-incrimination to corporations.3 0 6 Although both the Austra-
300. See supra notes 237-248 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
justifications for denying corporate right against self-incrimination); supra notes 262-
267 and accompanying text (discussing Australian High Court's justifications for deny-
ing right to corporations); supra notes 286-292 and accompanying text (discussing Eu-
ropean Union Court ofJustice's justification for allowing corporations right against self-
incrimination).
301. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 404-05 (discussing development of right as human
right to protect human dignity); see also David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCIAL L. REy. 1063, 1066 (1986) (discussing various
individual rationales for right against self-incrimination, including avoiding invasion of
privacy and protecting personal dignity).
302. See Caltex Refining Co. Pty. Ltd. v. State Pollution Control Commission, 25
N.S.W.L.R. 118, 127 (Ct.Crim.App. 1991) (Austl.) ("[The right] assists to hold a proper
balance between the powers of the State and the rights and interests of citizens. In that
term I include what are commonly described as 'corporate citizens.' "); see also 8 Wic-
MORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 2251, at 315 (describing right as a "barrier between
the individual whose self-incriminatory testimony is sought and the power of govern-
ment").
303. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964). The "cruel trilemma" is the choice that, absent a right against self-incrimina-
tion, the accused must make between the three options available to him: 1) accusing
himself; 2) lying and thereby committing perjury; or 3) refusing to answer and being
cited for contempt. Id.; see also Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 404 (citing to cruel trilemma as
rationale for modern privilege).
304. Id.; see 8 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 2251, at 309 (discussing avoid-
ance of torture as justification of right against self-incrimination); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (discussing role of right against self-incrimination in
avoiding physical torture).
305. See Bellis v. United States 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974). The Court states that the
Fifth Amendment protects an individual's" 'private enclave where he may lead a private
life.'" Id. (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55).
306. See supra notes 156-93 and accompanying text (discussing changes in theory
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lian High Court and the U.S. Supreme Court utilized these justi-
fication to deny a corporation the right against self-incrimina-
tion, finding that a corporation is not subject to these abuses
and indignities, °7 the historical basis for asserting these justifica-
tions has been repudiated by the recent revisions to the history
of the right against self-incrimination. 30 8  Furthermore, these
justifications can easily be characterized as alternative forms of
the balance-of-power argument.30 9
The contention that underlies the humanity-based justifica-
tions, that the right developed simply as a response to the physi-
cal or mental torture of individual human beings, 1 0 is belied by
the recent revisions to the history of the development of the
right's development.a' The right first appeared as a canonical
rule that balanced the state's desire to obtain information to
convict known criminals and heretics with protecting against the
overly intrusive powers of the state.312 More importantly, the
of right's historical development). The latest scholarship points out that the right did
not develop exclusively as a means to protect the individual from abuse. Id.; see also
Caltex Refining Co. Pty. Ltd. v. State Pollution Control Commission, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 118,
127 (Ct.CrimApp. 1991) (Austl.) (discussing change in conception of historical devel-
opment of right against self-incrimination).
307. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 405 (discussing inapplicability of torture to corpora-
tion as justification for denying right against self-incrimination to corporation); see also
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91-92 (discussing corporation's lack of right to privacy as justification
for denying right against self-incrimination to corporations).
308. See supra notes 156-93 and accompanying text (discussing changes in theory
of right's historical development).
309. See Lisa Tarallo, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End its Silence on the Rationale Behind the
Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 137, 163 (1992). "The tradi-
tional policy reason supporting the privilege against self-incrimination was to prevent
the tyrannical abuse of power by those in charge of the criminal justice system." Id.
This abuse of power included physical and psychological torture. Id. at 163. This policy
resembles the balance of power justification enunciated in Caltex Refining Co. v. State
Pollution Control Commission, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 118, 127 (Ct.Crim.App. 1991) (Austl.),
where the court stated that one justification of the right against self-incrimination is
"that it assists to hold a proper balance between the powers of the State and the rights
and interests of citizens." Id. The court went on to find that, pursuant to this balance
of power justification, a eorporation is entitled to the right against self-incrimination.
Id. at 127-28.
310. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 405 (discussing torture and right against self-incrimi-
nation).
311. See supra notes 156-93 and accompanying text (discussing new views of devel-
opment of right against self-incrimination).
312. See Helmholz, supra note 20, at 984.
Civilians did not regard a defendant's refusal to answer incriminating ques-
tions as the exercise of a fundamental personal right, never to be abridged.
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right did not take on its modern form and become a widely ap-
plied principle of law until the criminal justice system changed
from favoring the state's interest in conviction to requiring the
state to prove its case.3 13 Although the right against self-incrimi-
nation did mature as a result of its use in resisting the oath ex
officio,3 14 both its earliest appearance and its final evolution re-
sulted from attempts to maintain an equitable balance of power
between the state and the accused.1 5
Additionally, all of the humanity-based arguments, which
are based on the contention that the right against self-incrimina-
tion developed to combat abuses committed against natural per-
sons,3 1 6 can be characterized as versions of the balance-of-power
arguments. Specifically, these abuses were always inflicted by an
institution of the state, either the church or the Crown, on the
individual.' 7 In order to achieve its goals, the state was using
illegal and immoral methods to force information from the indi-
vidual, a clear example of a state abusing an inequitable balance
of power.31i Justifications such as avoiding the use of torture or
respecting an individual's privacy are thus actually arguments for
maintaining the balance of power between the state and the in-
They regarded it instead as a protection against the exercise of overly intrusive
powers by public official seeking to pry into the private lives of ordinary men
and women.
Id.
313. See supra note 315 (discussing development of right as aspect of maturation of
criminal justice system).
314. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing development of right
against self-incrimination in England as result of resistance to oath ex officio).
315. See supra notes 159-93 and accompanying text (discussing change in right
resulting from change in criminal procedure). The last stage of the right's develop-
ment was an aspect of the change from a criminal justice system which brought the
state's power to bear solely to obtain a confession or conviction to a criminal legal
system where the accused was procedurally protected from the immense power of the
state. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1047.
316. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) ("[T]he power to
compel the production of the records of any organization... arises out of the inherent
and necessary power of the federal and state governments to enforce their laws, with
the privilege against self-incrimination being limited to its historic function of protect-
ing only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testi-
mony or personal records.").
317. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing use of oath ex officio
and inquisitorial procedures in general by English Crown and Catholic Church during
English Inquisition).
318. See supra note 309 (discussing resemblance between avoidance of torture justi-
fication and balance of power justification).
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dividual by limiting the procedures the state can use to achieve
its goals."1 9 These humanity-based justifications therefore ulti-
mately support the argument that a corporation should also be
afforded the right against self-incrimination because, although a
corporation cannot be subjected to physical or psychological
pain, it can be harassed, even have its existence threatened, by a
state using illegal or immoral methods to obtain information
that the state desires.3 °
Unlike the humanity-based justifications for the application
of the right against self-incrimination to corporations, the bal-
ance of power justifications continue to be viable and valid. 21
For example, the balance of power argument was explicitly re-
lied on by the Australian High Court in Caltex,12 2 while the U.S.
Supreme Court and the European Union Court of Justice have
cited versions of the balance of power argument.323 This contin-
ued legitimacy,324 and the problems inherent in the humanity
based justifications, 2 compel a conclusion that the only justifi-
cation that is valid in determining if the right against self-incrim-
ination should be available to corporations is whether the use of
the right by a corporation would promote or inhibit a more eq-
319. See supra note 309 (discussing resemblance between avoidance of torture justi-
fication and balance of power justification).
320. See Triplex Safety Glass Co., Ltd. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934), Ltd. [1939]
2 KB. 395, 409.
It is true that a company cannot suffer all the pains to which a real person is
subject. It can, however, in certain cases be convicted and punished, with
grave consequences to its reputation and to its members, and we can see no
ground for depriving a juristic person of those safeguards which the law of
England accords to even the least deserving of natural persons.
Id.
321. See Environment Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392,
406 (1993) (Austl.) (citing to balance of power justification as recently as 1993). Addi-
tionally, the historical development of the right does not undermine the balance of
power justification. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text (discussing recent
revisions to theory of development of right against self-incrimination as proof that bal-
ance of power justification is only valid justification).
322. Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 406.
323. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (discussing detrimental effect on
state's police power if corporations allowed right against self-incrimination); Orkem SA
v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3350-51, 26-35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
502, 555-56 (discussing balancing of state's interest and corporation's rights of de-
fence).
324. See supra note 321-23 and accompanying text (discussing continued legiti-
macy of balance of power justifications of right against self-incrimination).
325. See supra notes 303-15 and accompanying text (discussing problems with hu-
manity based justifications of right against self-incrimination).
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uitable balance of power between corporations and the state. 26
B. The Shifting Balance of Power Between the State and
the Corporation
In comparing the U.S., Australian, and European Union ap-
proaches to a corporation's right against self-incrimination, the
decisive factor in determining which approach is superior is
whether a particular treatment will lead to a more or less equita-
ble balance of power between the state and corporations.32 7 The
corporation, because of various characteristics of its basic struc-
ture, has always been viewed as being in a better position than an
individual in any balance of power analysis.3 28 As a result, the
balance of power justification has been advanced as a rationale
for denying the right against self-incrimination to corpora-
tions.32 Recently, as the state's ability and desire to charge and
punish corporate misconduct has increased, the balance of
power between the state and the corporation has shifted in favor
of the state.330
The view that the balance of power between a corporation
and the state was relatively equal was based on the corporation's
extensive resources and the state's difficulty in successfully regu-
lating corporate action and prosecuting corporate crime 33t A
state faces various barriers in attempting to prosecute a corpora-
tion for criminal misconduct, including difficulty in determining
326. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why bal-
ance of power should be only justification examined in determining whether corpora-
tion would be allowed right against self-incrimination).
327. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why bal-
ance of power should be only justification examined in determining whether corpora-
tion would be allowed right against self-incrimination).
328. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing past view that corpora-
tions were in better position than individuals vis-a-vis the state).
329. See Environment Protection Authority v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392,t
406 (1993) (Aust.) (rejecting "without hesitation the suggestion that the availability of
the privilege to corporations achieves or would achieve a correct balance between the
Sate and corporation."). The Australian High Court based this rejection on the difficul-
ties the corporate structure presents to the state's attempts to regulate the corporation.
Id.
330. See Webb, supra note 198, at 618-19 (discussing increased criminalization of
regulatory offenses and predicting that average fine will top US$1 million under Orga-
nizational Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
331. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). The Court states that
"many federal and state laws would be impossible" to enforce if a corporation could
shield its internal documents with the right against self-incrimination. Id.
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corporate wrongdoings that are provable only by examining cor-
porate documents, problems in discovering if a crime was even
committed, difficulty in determining the culpable party, and the
state's inability to punish effectively and thereby deter corporate
misconduct.33 2 To add to these difficulties by allowing a corpo-
ration to limit further the state's access to relevant information
through the use of the right against self-incrimination was
viewed as implausible. 3
In the last half-century, however, corporate misconduct has
become a major societal concern.3 3 4 This concern has resulted
in increased criminal and non-criminal regulation of corporate
entities.335  This increased regulation, and the resulting in-
creased prosecution of corporations and their managers,3 3 6
serves to answer many of the concerns expressed regarding the
inherent difficulty in prosecuting corporations for the wrongs. 337
For example, the new treatment of corporate crime avoids any
difficulty in determining who the culpable party was by subject-
332. See Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 406 (discussing characteristics of corporations that
make corporations more difficult to regulate).
333. See supra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing Australian High Court's
rejection without hesitation of argument that right against self-incrimination will aid in
achieving equitable balance of power between state and corporation).
334. See Wolf, supra note 217, at 1 (discussing increase in prosecutions over last
two decades); see also Francis T. Cullen et al., The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond: Corporate
Crime, Moral Boundaries, and the Criminal Sanction, in CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS 107,
108 (Ellen Hochstedler ed., 1984).
[P] ublic awareness of white-collar and corporate crime has reached the point
where the concept has become part of the common vernacular. Further, sur-
vey data indicate that the public judges such criminality to be more serious
than ever before, is quite prepared to sanction white-collar offenders, and is
far more cognizant of the costs of upperworld crime than had been previously
imagined.
Id.
335. See Wolf, supra note 217, at 3 ("Today, criminal provisions in major environ-
mental statues are ubiquitous.").
336. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing increased rate of con-
viction of corporate executives).
337. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing some corporate charac-
teristics that may make it difficult to regulate corporate entities). Prosecutors and law
makers have adopted several strategies to increase the effectiveness of corporate regula-
tion and prosecution, including increasing individual liability for corporate executives,
requirements of corporate internal compliance programs, and an increased range of
penalties. See Webb et al., supra note 198, at 617-18 (discussing expanding corporate
criminal liability); see also Bennett, supra note 216, at 881-82 (1990) ("A final trend.., is
the increasing use of criminal sanctions against corporate executives rather than, or in
addition to, the corporation itself.").
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ing high ranking executives and the corporation itself to in-
creased liability.338 Likewise, increased criminalization of regula-
tory violations and more drastic penalties for criminal violations
increase the punishment and deterrence factors.3 3 9
States are increasingly allowed to charge a corporation, sub-
poena its records, and then subject the corporation and its exec-
utives to a penalty based on the information contained in the
subpoenaed records.34 ° Thus, although corporations are still in
a better position vis-a-vis the state than is the individual, 4 1 the
balance of power has shifted to the extent that corporations
need protection from the misuse of state conduct.34 2 Allowing
corporations to claim the right against self-incrimination would
serve to restore an equitable balance of power between the state
and the corporation. 43
C. Finding an Appropriate Treatment of the Corporate Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The U.S. and Australian courts base their conclusion that a
corporation has no right against self-incrimination on outmoded
policy justifications, especially the belief that the right developed
strictly as right protecting natural persons from possible abuse by
the state. 344 This view ignores recent scholarship concerning the
338. See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text (discussing increased prosecu-
tion of corporate executives).
339. See supra note 330 (discussing increase in average fines to which corporation
is subject); see also Mark Muro, What Punishment Fits A Corporate Crime?, Boston Globe, May
7, 1989, at Al (estimating that since 1982, 375 prosecutions of corporate officers has
resulted in 75 years of jail time).
340. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1988) (discussing use of
collective entity doctrine to enforce subpoena issued to sole shareholder of corporation
that required him to turn over records that were self-incriminatory).
341. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text (setting forth characteristics
which normally give corporation advantage over individual in balance of power with
state).
342. See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for chang-
ing balance of power between state and corporation).
343. See Caltex Refining Co. v. State Pollution Control Commission, 25 N.S.W.L.RI
118, 127 (Ct.CrimApp. 1991) (Austi.) (outlining role of right against self-incrimination
in maintaining balance of power between state and corporation).
344. See Environment Protection Agency v. Caltex Refining Co., 118 A.L.R. 392,
404-05 (1993) (discussing development of right as protection for natural person from
abuses of state as key justification for denying right against self-incrimination to corpo-
rations); see United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944) (describing basis of
right against self-incrimination as protection of humanity and dignity of individual and
1995] CORPORATE SELF-INCRMINATION 2185
historical development of the right."M 5 More significantly,
although recognizing that the maintenance of an equitable bal-
ance of power between the state and the corporation is one of
the main justifications for applying the right against self-incrimi-
nation to a given situation, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
High Court of Australia ignore the changing relationship be-
tween the state and corporations, thereby mistakenly concluding
that the balance of power justification supports the denial of the
right against self-incrimination to corporations.M6
In contrast, the European Union offers a prime example of
applying a balance-of-power analysis that does not ignore the
current relative strengths of the state and corporations to deter-
mine if a corporation should be able to claim the right against
self-incrimination.M? The utilization of the rights of defence
concept, which offer a reasonable limit on the state's power to
pursue its otherwise legitimate goals, imply a goal of maintaining
an equitable balance of power between the state and the corpo-
ration . 4  The Court of Justice's approach takes into account
fears that the state may not be able to effectively regulate corpo-
rations by allowing the corporation the right against self-incrimi-
nation but then determining in a strict manner that information
is actually incriminatory.3 49 This approach incorporates the con-
citing this application to natural persons as justification for not applying to corpora-
tions).
-345. See supra notes 156-93 and accompanying text (discussing recent revisions to
theory of historical development of right against self-incrimination).
346. See Cal/ex, 118 A.L.R. at 406 (determining that the balance-of-power analysis
weighs against allowing right to corporations); White, 322 U.S. at 700-01. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court does not explicitly utilize a balance of power analysis, it does claim
that the need to protect the state's ability to prosecute organizations requires the denial
of the right against self-incrimination to corporations. White, 322 U.S. at 700-01; see also
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 (calling white-collar crime "one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities"). The Australian High Court, in contrast,
does an explicit balance of power analysis but determines that the right would hinder
regulation of corporations and thus actually create an imbalance of power in favor of
the corporation. Caliex, 118 A.L.R. at 406.
347. See Orkem SA v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3350-51, 1
26-35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502, 555-56 (discussing balancing of state's interest and corpo-
ration's rights of defence). The Court of Justice explicitly considers both the state's
need to know and the corporations fundamental rights. Id.
348. See NV Nederlansche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/
81, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, 3498, 1 7, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 318 (describing rights of
defence as "fundamental principle of community law which the commission must ob-
serve in administrative procedures which may lead to the imposition of penalties").
349. See Snyder, supra note 285, at 965-66 (discussing Orkem court's allowance of
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cerns regarding the expanding powers of the state in relation to
the corporation while still allowing the state access to much of
the information it requires to protect its citizenry and environ-
ment.350 Although the rights of defence are not an available ba-
sis for deciding this issue in other jurisdictions, the underlying
balance of power analysis would still result in the application of
the right against self-incrimination to corporations. 51
CONCLUSION
The recent revisions to the theory of the development of
the right against self-incrimination establish that the right did
not develop solely as mechanism for the protection of natural
persons against physical and psychological abuses and indigni-
ties. Thus, a corporation should not automatically be denied
the right based on any argument that the right against self-in-
crimination developed solely as a human right. As a result, the
balance-of-power justification is the most valid remaining justifi-
cation for determining the application of the right against self-
incrimination to corporations. If the increasing ability of the
state to regulate, prosecute and sanction corporations is ac-
knowledged, the balance of power analysis results in a conclu-
sion that the corporation is at an increasing disadvantage, and
like natural persons, deserves the right against self-incrimination
in order to protect itself from state misconduct. More impor-
tantly, this conclusion compels reconsideration of any decisions
denying the right to individuals based solely on their status as
corporate employees. High ranking executives and officers who
may be held individually liable for corporate crime must there-
fore be able to claim the corporation's right against self-incrimi-
nation as their own whenever subjected to possible punishment
for the corporation's misdeeds.
any questions that were purely factual and resulting significant reduction of importance
of allowing right against self-incrimination to corporations); see also Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at
398 (discussing limited application of allowing right against self-incrimination to corpo-
rations because, as corporations cannot testify at trial, right would only apply to corpo-
rate documents).
350. See supra note 349 and accompanying text (discussing how interest of both
state and corporations are protected).
351. See e.g., Caltex Refining Co. Pty. Ltd. v. State Pollution Control Commission,
25 N.S.W.L.R. 118, 127 (CLCrimApp. 1991) (Ausd.) (applying balance-of-power analy-
sis and determining that corporations should have right against self-incrimination).
